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Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, 
and Realism 
Michael A. Mazzuchi 
A major vehicle for litigation in the federal courts over the past 
twenty years has been 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 1 
As conventionally interpreted, section 1983 confers two important 
advantages on plaintiffs who can invoke its provisions: it creates a 
cause of action for damages2 and, in conjunction with a complemen-
tary statute, it authorizes a court to award successful plaintiffs attor-
ney's fees.3 A plaintiff can only bring a lawsuit under section 1983, 
however, if her "right[ ] ... secured by the Constitution and laws" has 
been violated by a person acting under color of state law. In three 
recent cases, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Wilder 
v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 5 and Dennis v. Higgins, 6 the Supreme Court 
reformulated its test for when a law creates a "right," and therefore 
when section 1983 is available. In Golden State Transit, the Court 
decided that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), by preempt-
ing state regulation of collective bargaining between employers and 
unions, conferred on the bargaining parties a federal "right" to be free 
from governmental interference in the bargaining process. 7 In Wilder, 
the Court held that certain Medicaid provisions of the Social Security 
Act created "rights" in health care providers to enforce "reasonable" 
rates of reimbursement by participating states. 8 In Dennis, the Court 
held that the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state regula-
tions that discriminate against interstate commerce, created a "right" 
1. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
2. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overroled by Monell v. Department of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe only "insofar as it holds that local governments 
are wholly immune from suit under§ 1983"). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). 
4. 493 U.S. 103 (1989). 
5. 110 s. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
6. 111 s. Ct. 865 (1991). 
7. 493 U.S. at 109-12. 
8. 110 S. Ct. at 2525. 
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in businesses to be free from such regulations.9 
The issue of whether a statute creates a right has arisen fre-
quently10 since the Court held in Maine v. Thiboutot 11 that any federal 
law, not simply a civil rights law or constitutional provision, can cre-
ate rights enforceable through section 1983. Unless every plaintiff 
may enforce all federal laws, a judge interpreting section 1983 must 
distinguish those laws that create rights from those which do not. 
Before Golden State Transit and Wilder, however, the Court had only 
rarely and superficially discussed how it determines whether a sta~ute 
creates a right within the meaning of section 1983 - despite the im-
portance of this question to lower courts facing a multitude of suits 
claiming various rights. 12 Thiboutot did not articulate a standard for 
determining when a statute creates a right, and until Golden State 
Transit, subsequent cases failed to clarify the issue. 13 
If a statutory claim does not fall under section 1983, a plaintiff 
must establish an "implied right of action" under the statute to obtain 
either injunctive or compensatory relief. In marked contrast to its fail-
ure to define "rights" in Thiboutot, the Court, in a series of cases 
around the time Thiboutot was decided, frequently addressed the ques-
tion of when federal statutes create implied rights of action. 14 The 
implied right of action test provided that a plaintiff could enforce a 
federal statute if the statute created a right for the plaintiff, and if 
Congress intended that right to be enforceable in a lawsuit. In Golden 
State Transit and Wilder, the Court explicitly employed the first aspect 
of the implied right of action analysis - the existence of a right - to 
establish a test for rights within the meaning of section 1983. It held 
that the existence of a right within the meaning of section 1983 creates 
a presumption that that right is enforceable through a private 
remedy. 15 
This Note criticizes the Court's current reconciliation of the im-
plied right of action and section 1983 inquiries, and argues that the 
availability oflawsuits under section 1983 should be the same as under 
an implied right of action test. Part I, by offering a working definition 
of rights, suggests an approach to identifying statutorily created rights. 
9. 111 S. Ct. at 870-72. 
10. See, e.g., Wright v. Roanoake Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987); Mid-
dlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); see also cases cited infra notes 163-64, 170. 
11. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
12. Section 1983 cases are a major source offederal civil rights litigation; one study estimated 
that "constitutional torts," of which § 1983 cases comprise the greatest proportion, account for 
approximately half of all civil rights claims. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The 
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 669 (1987). 
13. See infra notes 149-70 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 175, 191-92 and accompanying text. 
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Part II discusses the evolution of the Court's implied right of action ' 
jurisprudence, and explores several explanations for the Court's hesi-
tancy to create implied rights of action. Part III examines the influ-
ence of the Court's implied right of action test on its jurisprudence of 
rights under section 1983. Part IV applies these arguments to criticize 
Professor Henry Monaghan's recent examination of the jurisprudence 
of rights in Wilder and Golden State Transit. 
This Note concludes that the Court's treatment of section 1983 has 
been inconsistent with its approach to implied rights of action. The 
Court has been far more permissive in allowing private enforcement of 
statutes where section 1983 applies, basing its distinction on the ex-
plicit authorization of private actions contained in section 1983.16 
This Note argues, however, that a federal statute should create the 
same principal rights and remedies regardless of whether section 1983 
applies. Because section 1983 conditions a cause of action on the 
existence of rights in the plaintiff, a cause of action should exist under 
section 1983 if and only if the relevant statute would create an implied 
right of action. As a matter of sound jurisprudence, the inquiry as to 
whether a plaintiff has a right and whether he can bring a lawsuit must 
be one and the same. 
I. DEFINING RIGHTS: REALIST ADVICE 
A. Rights and Remedies 
By conditioning a plaintiff's cause of action on violation of his 
rights, section 1983 raises a fundamental question: What is a right? 
While defining rights is an impossibly complex task for a student 
Note, 17 any interpretation of section 1983 demands at least a working 
definition. Section I.A summarizes the arguments of Realist legal phi-
losophy, which establish that a plaintiff's rights are always coextensive 
with the remedies she can obtain from the officials of the state. Section 
I.B relates the Realist notion of rights to the concepts of separated 
powers and judicial review. 18 
Section 1983's reference to rights is obviously limited to legal 
rights, as opposed to moral rights, and any definition of legal rights 
must first explore that difference. One of the primary aspects of the 
Realist movement was its demand that moral and legal rights be kept 
rigidly distinct. As Justice Holmes explained in The Path of the Law: 
The primary rights and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself 
again are nothing but prophecies. One of the many evil effects of the 
confusion between legal and moral ideas . . . is that theory is apt to get 
16. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2517 n.9. 
17. Cf. 4 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 56 (1959) ("There is no more ambiguous word in 
legal and juristic literature than the word right."). 
18. The later parts of this Note apply these Realist insights to the issue of statutorily created 
rights and rights within the meaning of section 1983. 
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the cart before the horse, and to consider the right or the duty as some-
thing existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its 
breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward. But ... a legal 
duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits 
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment 
of the court; - and so of a legal right.19 
Holmes' understanding of rights may be illustrated by basic con-
tract law, which demonstrates the difference between moral rights and 
legal rights in the context of promises. For example, assume B wishes 
to sell his farm, and A desires to purchase it. Any number of moral 
obligations may prompt B to make the sale to A: A may be a relative 
or close friend, B may owe her a great debt of gratitude for past favors. 
Yet A only has a legal right to B's performance when B's action be-
comes mandatory, that is, where B has made a promise supported by 
consideration and binds himself to the contract. If B makes a promise 
but does not receive consideration from A, B may still have a moral 
duty to keep the promise, and A may correspondingly have a moral 
right to the land. As long as B receives no consideration, however, his 
promise creates no legal liability.20 
Even if A and B form a contract, numerous provisions of contract 
law dealing with remedies may limit A's ability to compel B's perform-
ance. For example, if A and B's contract were for goods, not land, A 
might not be able to compel specific performance and acquire the ac-
tual goods; she may have to accept compensation in damages should B 
breach the contract.21 Another of the achievements of the Realist 
movement was to demonstrate that in this circumstance, the gap be-
tween what A has contracted for and the remedy she can obtain in 
court should be conceived as a difference in A's rights, not simply as a 
difference in remedies. The identification of rights and remedies was 
directly linked to the conceptual separation of law and morality. Be-
cause morality is different from legality, the Realists argued, any dis-
course concerning whether a legal right exists must focus not on the 
moral relations between individuals that underlie a legal dispute, but 
on the manner and extent to which the law has recognized these moral 
interests. 
19. 0.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). 
20. The above account of rights would be incomplete if it simply required B's action to be 
mandatory in a general sense. The mere fact that one person's action is mandatory does not give 
all other people a right to that action. B's selling the farm is made mandatory by her promise for 
consideration, but only with respect to A, the promisee. C: who is not a party to the contract, 
generally has no right to B's performance. C may, of course, have an interest in B's performance 
- for example, he may sell farm tools and have special contacts with A. Yet if the contract was 
not made expressly for C's benefit, he has no right to enforce it. In common law, as in statutory 
law, the question of whether a person has a right is indistinguishable from the question of 
whether he has standing to enforce an obligation. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
21. See LoN L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 271-72 (4th ed. 
1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-716 (1990). 
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· Karl Llewellyn summed up the Realist position in Bramble Bush. 
Llewellyn wrote: "The cynic . . . says: a right is best measured by 
effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of rem-
edy is defect of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts 
will do."22 Llewellyn's point was that where an individual cannot ob-
tain real relief on the basis of a law, that law cannot create rights for 
him.23 
Llewellyn's argument that rights are identical with remedies de-
rived its force from his focus on the role that the state24 - through the 
courts - plays in the maintenance of systems of private rights. A 
Realist would point out that a conception of rights that only describes 
legal relations between two parties is incomplete; the transaction be-
tween A and B also creates a legal relationship between A and the 
state, which is obligated to enforce the contract. By committing itself 
to enforce the contracts made between parties, the state creates a legal 
right to such enforcement. Conversely, if A cannot enforce her claim 
through state coercion, her right would recede to the status of an in-
terest or moral right.2s 
Once all legal rights are traced to the state, the identification of 
rights with remedies becomes persuasive. If the state gives with one 
hand - that is, creates a right - but takes away with the other - by 
withholding from the rightholder any remedy - the state has in real-
ity created no right at all. The statement that A has a right to the farm 
presupposes the existence of a coercive regime of remedies by which 
the state enforces contracts. A's legal right against B consists in the 
state's obligation to afford A due process of law by enforcing her 
contract. 
The identity of rights with remedies is thus intimately connected 
with a notion that there are no truly private legal rights.26 A scheme 
of private rights differs from other rights only in that some antecedent 
public act - for example, the state's recognition of a cause of action to 
enforce contracts - gives private parties the authority to create legal 
relationships.27 Because every legal right depends on state interven-
22. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 94 (1960). 
23. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 
431 (1930); GEORGE c. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 790 (1973) ("[T]he legal realists quite 
rightly castigated as just plain nonsense" the notion of" 'rights without remedies.' "). 
24. State is used in this discussion in the abstract sense of political entity, not in the context 
of American federalism. 
25. See, e.g., o.w. HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 214 (1881) ("Just so far as the aid of 
the public force is given a man, he has a legal right ...• "). 
26. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REv. 1195, 1308-12 (1982); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of 
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1437 & n.21 (1988) (noting that an array of common law 
"private" rights constitutes a regulatory system, in which the state is a participant through its 
court-ordered enforcement of the "natural" distributional scheme). 
27. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
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tibn, an individual's real rights rest in the ability to obtain enforcement 
of duties which the state has either prescribed directly, or allowed in-
dividuals to impose on themselves through private agreements.28 
B. Rights, the Rule of Law, and Judicial Review 
Realism's argument that moral rights differ from legal rights, cou-
pled with its insistence that what the state does about a dispute deter-
mines the rights of the parties, raises a disturbing question: Can the 
state's action - that is, what it does - ever violate a person's legal 
rights? Intuition suggests that if actual practices determine legal 
rights, the state's deviation from a well-established practice ought to 
be defined as a violation of rights, not an alteration of them. Indeed, 
the legal rights of the parties in the above example could not be ex-
plained fully without referring to some obligation of the state to adhere 
to the past practice of enforcing contracts. For the Realist, the legal 
rights of private parties depend paradoxically on the moral obligations 
of the state. 29 
Realism notoriously ignored this consequence of its initial insights 
and fell into excessive emphasis on the law as a prediction of what the 
state's officials, especially judges, would do in fact, regardless of legal 
obligations. 30 Legal philosophers reacted to this Realist error by rede-
fining law not as consisting of the raw actions of state officials, but 
their rule-directed actions. Although this question of legal philosophy 
remains open, in other than very extreme circumstances a state's arbi-
trary and unjust actions are still considered "legal." Yet the notion of 
the rule of law, and of a well-developed legal system, requires that a 
state's officials consider its laws morally binding.31 The state must 
keep its promises, decide like cases alike, and conform to its own laws; 
when faced with extreme deviations from the rule of law, the citizen 
may lose her obligation to treat the state's directives as law.32 The 
basic Realist point remains: to assess legal rights, one must inquire 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 145-46 (tent. ed. 1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 27-28 (1961) (discussing laws that confer "legal powers" upon individuals to "create ... 
structures of rights and duties within the coercive framework of the law"). 
The characterization of these private lawmaking capacities as involving rights blurs the tradi-
tional distinction between rights and powers, the latter being defined as "a legally recognized or 
conferred capacity of creating, divesting, or altering rights, powers, and privileges and so of 
creating duties and liabilities." 4 POUND, supra note 17, at 93. 
28. Cf. 4 POUND, supra note 17, at 43 (noting that historically, actions of courts gave rise to 
the concept of causes of action, which in turn created the notion of duty, and finally "a correla-
tive right was found by jurists behind the duty"); see also Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 435-38 
(same). 
29. See Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat, 59 HARV. L. REv. 376, 386-89 (1946). 
30. See, e.g., CHRISTIE, supra note 23, at 785-87. 
31. HART, supra note 27, at 132-37 (stating that in legal systems, individuals "continuously 
express in normative terms their shared acceptance of the law as a guide to conduct"). 
32. See LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-44, 122-23 (rev. ed. 1969) (discussing 
degrees of "legality) 
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into what the lawmaking organs of the state have resolved to do about 
a dispute, not into the parties' relative moral merits. Yet the state's 
decision takes the form of a rule, from which it cannot deviate 
arbitrarily. 
The commitment to the rule of law in the modern American con-
stitutional design is reflected in an institutional division of labor 
designed to avoid the failure of the state to fulfill its moral obligation 
to obey its own laws. The legislative, executive and judicial branches 
are conceptually all part of one state. The institution of judicial re-
view, however, sets the judiciary apart from the state and ensures that 
where the legislative and executive branches have made laws, an in-
dependent judiciary is available to enforce them. 33 The judicial pro-
cess enables litigants to ensure that the state's moral obligation to obey 
its laws is enforced by the state itself. 
The practice of judicial review in the American legal system, in 
statutory and administrative as well as constitutional cases, was estab-
lished by Marbury v. Madison. 34 In Marbury, the plaintiff William 
Marbury sued to compel Secretary of State James Madison to deliver 
the plaintiff's commission as a federal judge. In assessing the merits of 
Marbury's claim, Justice Marshall rejected an analogy to property law 
that would have required that the commission be delivered before 
Marbury's right to it could vest. Instead, Marshall established a test 
for determining whether a policymaking body's official action had cre-
ated a right: he argued that because the policymaker had performed 
its last discretionary act, it had formed a legal commitment to act that 
the judiciary could enforce.35 Marshall argued that because Marbury 
had a right to his commission, the rule of law would be undermined 
unless he could sue for its delivery: "The government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of 
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."36 
The decision in Marbury is often associated with the maxim ubi 
ius, ibi remedium, 37 "wherever there is a right, there is a remedy."38 
33. See id. at 81-82. 
34. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
35. The conclusion that this right necessitated a cause of action, and that a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction would have the power to award relief, led Marshall to the more famous conclu-
sion that the statute creating original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was unconstitutional. 
See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-8. 
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. 
37. See, e.g., H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied 
Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (1986). 
38. Marshall stated the maxim in English, noting that "it is a general and indisputable rule, 
that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever 
that right is invaded." 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 163 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *23); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 400 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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In stressing the congruence between rights and remedies, Marshall ex-
pressed in a different context the Realist insight that dept;ivation of a 
remedy is deprivation of a right. Both the Realists and Marshall 
urged that the existence of a right turns on the real behavior of state 
officials. In the case of the Realists, the rights at issue were generally 
common law, judicially created rights; the Realist's point was that ju-
dicial acknowledgement of abstract "rights" that parties could not en-
force in court was nonsense. In Marbury, Justice Marshall argued 
that it was equally irrational to suppose that the executive was acting 
through law in appointing Marbury, if courts could not hold the exec-
utive to conform to such law.39 
In sum, the Realist theory of the relationship between law and mo-
rality establishes that the actions of the state taken pursuant to legal 
rules determine legal rights. It forecloses any attempt to argue that a 
right exists even though the state does not provide a legal remedy. A 
moral right may exist even if a legal remedy does not accompany it, 
but a legal right cannot so exist, because it is identical with a legal 
remedy. 
C. Rejecting Any Distinction Between Rights and Remedies 
Even if the separation between moral and legal rights is accepted, 
however, one might still argue against the complete identity between 
legal rights and remedies. This section extends the basic Realist thesis 
to reject other possible attempts to distinguish rights and remedies. 
One conventional view is that rights and remedies are linked, but are 
not identical. This argument may take two forms. First, rights may 
be characterized as stemming from the general standards imposed by a 
state, whereas remedies involve a court's or an agency's discretionary 
implementation of those standards. Similarly, one might argue that 
rights can be located in a statute's purposes or aims, and that remedies 
are the implementation of these purposes by a court. This second 
point corresponds to a jurisdictional allocation: legislatures create 
rights, through laws; but courts provide remedies consisting of various 
means of enforcement. 
With respect to the first distinction, the Realist would accept the 
characterization of statutory standards, so long as they were enforcea-
ble, as rights. To the extent a law grants discretion to an official, how-
ever, the range of remedies ceases to be constrained by rights; the 
notion of discretion implies that the parties have no legal claim to a 
decision either one way or another.40 Before President Adams exer-
39. Cf. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
199-200 (10th ed. 1959) (stating that "there runs through the English constitution that insepara-
ble connection between the means of enforcing a right and the right to be enforced," and that 
"the statesmen of America have shown unrivaled skill in providing means for giving legal secur-
ity to the rights declared by American constitutions"). 
40. See HART, supra note 27, at 121-32. But see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
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cised his discretion to appoint Marbury, Marbury had no right to a 
commission; after that discretion had been exercised, he did. In ac-
cordance with the demand of the rule of law that like cases be decided 
alike, a judgment as to what is reasonable in one case may bind a 
future judgment of reasonableness in a similar case. Yet when a court 
or agency makes a discretionary judgment with respect to an open-
ended standard, it is more properly conceived of as making rights, not 
exercising a constrained remedial authority. 
Similarly, for the Realist the purposes motivating a statute are like 
the moral rights underlying legal disputes between private parties;41 
purposes by themselves do not create legal rights. One may agree that 
"statutory language cannot be intelligently interpreted in isolation 
from the background understandings from which it arises"42 without 
conceding that because legal rights are always defined by texts, the 
purpose of a law is itself a law, or that parties have legal rights that the 
purposes of statutes be fulfilled. Even though "[t]he demarcation be-
tween 'statutory interpretation' ... on the one hand, and judge-made 
law on the other, is not a sharp line,"43 they do differ.44 Perhaps the 
best evidence for this distinction between interpreting law and making 
it is that courts themselves frequently distinguish statutory interpreta-
tion from implementing statutory purposes by making new law.45 
One can likewise insist on a distinction between the purpose of a 
statute and the rights it creates, and yet accept that a statute might 
create rights by endorsing certain goals. For example, a statute creat-
OUSLY 31-39 (1977) (arguing that application of principles is not properly described as 
"discretionary"). 
41. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
42. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1229 (footnote omitted). 
43. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
44. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive 
Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 769-70 (1989); Martin H. 
Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor Weinberg, 
83 Nw. U. L. REv. 853, 856-58 (1989); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, 81 MICH. L. REV. 20, 60 (1988) ("Nautical interpretation" approach "does not 
ask the interpreter to undertake the legislative task of devising public policy."); Peter Westen & 
Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 18 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
331-36 (1980) (The distinction between common law and statutory interpretation "is entirely one 
of degree," but this does not "deny any meaningful distinction between statutory interpretation 
and common law adjudication."); cf RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 404-07 (1986) ("The 
law we have, the actual concrete law for us, is fixed by inclusive integrity": "inclusive integrity" 
in part "define[s] [a judge's] powers against those of other institutions and officers."). Even an 
advocate of candid judicial lawmaking such as Professor William Eskridge apparently sees a 
distinction between interpreting and making law; he has argued that "moderate contextualism 
does not assert that the interpreter is entirely unconstrained," and that "[i]n most cases ••• the 
text and the interpretive history of the statute will provide relatively determinate answers, or at 
least narrow the range of permissible debate." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory In-
terpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1510-11 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
45. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 402 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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ing an administrative agency might require that the rules an agency 
promulgates address certain basic goals, yet leave the agency with sig-
nificant discretion as to how to implement those goals. Such a statute 
still constrains discretion, and thus creates legal rights to some degree: 
if the agency wholly ignores the statutorily endorsed goals, an individ-
ual may obtain judicial relief against the agency action.46 In other 
words, the statutory purpose in this circumstance actually creates a 
right of access to an agency willing to use its discretion to serve the 
statute's goals.47 The basic Realist point remains intact - the 
agency's good faith pursuit of the statute's goals, rather than the goals 
themselves, constitutes the rights created by the statute. 
II. IMPLIED RIGHTS OF AerION 
This Part applies the Realist identity between rights and remedies 
to critique the Court's implied right of action jurisprudence. Section 
II.A examines the relationship between implied rights of action and 
common law adjudication. Section II.B describes the Court's early 
approach to implied rights of action, in which the Court endorsed the 
use of implied rights of action to supplement statutory rights. Section 
II.C discusses the Court's retreat from its expansive approach to im-
plied rights of action, beginning with the influential case Cort v. Ash. 48 
It then recounts the transition from Cort to the current doctrine, 
which disallows implied rights of action unless Congress specifically 
intends that they be provided. The section argues that this jurispru-
dence of statutory rights erroneously separates rights and remedies. 
Section II.D argues that the theory behind the congressional intent 
test undermines the notions of judicial review that have prevailed since 
Marbury v. Madison. Finally, section II.E offers an alternative expla-
nation for the Court's retreat from implied rights of action that is con-
sistent with a Realist theory of rights. It draws an analogy to the law 
of standing to argue that the Court justifiably places a heavy burden 
on a plaintiff seeking to establish a cause of action for damages. 49 
46. These ideas are expressed in familiar doctrines of administrative law. The nondelegation 
doctrine affirms that a·statute may grant an agency broad discretion, so long as "it provides the 
recipient of that authority with an 'intelligible principle' to guide the exercise of the delegated 
discretion," and "ensures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative 
discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards." Industrial Union 
Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring). The notion of "hard look" judicial review of discretionary administrative decisions in 
turn establishes that an agency's regulations may be overturned where the agency "entirely fail[s] 
to consider an important aspect of the problem." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
47. Professor Philip Soper has advocated a similar characterization of the limits of the 
"legal" authority of the state; Soper argues that the directives of the state are legal so long as the 
officials responsible for them are acting in good faith pursuit of the interests of the community. 
See PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 80-83, 117-22 (1984). 
48. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
49. This Part faces an inescapable problem of terminology. As this Note has argued in Part 
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A. State and Federal Contexts 
Implied rights of action are a familiar feature of state tort law. In 
a negligence action, for example, safety statutes such as speed limits 
create implied rights of action by serving as the standard of care. 
Although phrased differently, judicial application of the statute in a 
tort claim is functionally the same as establishing a right of action for 
damages under the statute itself. In both cases, violation of the statute 
alone suffices to establish liability.so 
The substitution of the standard of care terminology for that of 
implied rights, however, emphasizes that application of the statute to 
create a damage remedy may have nothing to do with rights per se: 
the rule of law may not require it. Instead, application of a statute to 
provide a standard of care often results from a judicial policy choice to 
make law through common law adjudication. The legislature, for ex-
ample, may have decided to deter risky activity by making speeders 
criminally liable. Courts with the authority to assess reasonable care 
in negligence claims may decide that the legislative purpose could best 
be furthered by making speeders civilly liable as well, thus increasing 
the level of deterrence.s1 The rule of law does not mandate such a 
choice: the state may not have to award damages to those injured by 
violation of the statute, only to criminally prosecute offenders. Yet in 
its common law capacity, the court may determine that such a policy 
is desirable. 
The earliest Supreme Court case approving an implied right of ac-
tion closely resembled the application of a statute as a standard of care 
in a negligence action. sz In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, s3 
the plaintiff was injured when a defective ladder caused him to fall off 
a boxcar. The ladder violated the Federal Safety Appliance Act be-
I, rights and remedies are identical. The vast majority of the language used by the Court in its 
implied right of action cases, however, separates the two notions. Although this Part will argue 
that such separation is erroneous, it is impossible to discuss the cases without adopting their 
terminology. Thus, this Part seeks initially to discuss the implied right of action cases in their 
own terms, yet then establish that the separation of rights and remedies is illogical and obscures 
the real issues behind the implied right of action cases. 
50. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920); R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OP 
TORTS§ 874A (1977); see also Johnson v. Clark, 418 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating that use of a statute that does not create an implied right of action for damages to 
establish duty in a negligence case is "trying to do indirectly what [plaintiff] may not do di· 
rectly."); see generally MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNA· 
TIVES 62-75 (4th ed. 1987). Professor Foy points out that the usual application ofa statute as the 
standard of care within a negligence action is backwards: originally, the statute provided the 
cause of action itself. Only in the nineteenth century did an action on the statute become con-
fused with an application of the statute as standard of care. Foy, supra note 37, at 540-46. 
51. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1296-307. 
52. See Paul Wartelle & Jeffrey H. Louden, Private Enforcement of Federal Statutes: The 
Role of the Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 492-93 (1982). 
53. 241 U.S. 33 (1916), overruled by Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
March 1992] Note - Rights, Remedies, and Realism 1073 
cause the boxcar did not have "secure grab-irons or handholds."54 
The Court found that the statute created a federal cause of action for 
the plaintiff, reasoning that "[a] disregard of the command of the stat-
ute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class 
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover 
the damages from the party in default is implied .... "55 
In areas regulated by the states, both courts and legislatures exer-
cise policymaking authority.56 In the federal arena, however, the fed-
eral courts possess a much more restricted authority to make common 
law. When a federal court faces a lawsuit based on a federal statute, it 
cannot simply apply the statute as the standard of care within a more 
general form of action such as tort, because these causes of action are 
the province of state law. After the Supreme Court's landmark deci-
sion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 51 therefore, the viability of deci-
sions such as Rigsby was questionable to the extent the decisions 
depended on a federal common law of tort. 58 
B. Rights with Added Remedies: The Expansive Approach 
Implied rights of action survived Erie because the federal courts 
continued to exercise a different sort of common law power. Instead 
of applying a statute within a preexisting form of action, the Court 
interpreted the statute and fashioned remedies designed to further the 
statute's purpose. The principal example of this approach was J.L 
Case Co. v. Borak 59 In Borak, the plaintiff was a stockholder in a 
corporation that had merged on the basis of a deceptive proxy solicita-
tion. The plaintiff argued that the proxy solicitation violated the Se-
curities Exchange Act, and should therefore render the defendant 
liable for the resulting damages. The Court upheld the implied cause 
of action, stating that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide 
such remedies as are necessary. to make effective the congressional 
purpose. "60 
In 1971, the Court established a complement to Borak in the con-
stitutional context in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics. 61 In Bivens, the Court inferred a cause of action 
for damages directly from the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of free-
54. 241 U.S. at 37. 
55. 241 U.S. at 39. 
56. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 881, 898 (1986); Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response 
to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1147 (1985). 
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
58. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1223-25; see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
441 U.S. 677, 742-47 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
59. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
60. 377 U.S. at 433. 
61. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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dom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The majority opinion 
cited Borak and relied upon the Court's general authority to enforce 
legal rights "through a particular remedial mechanism normally avail-
able in the federal courts."62 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens discussed in greater 
detail the source of the Court's authority to create remedies. Harlan 
argued that "the presence of a substantive right derived from federal 
law"63 justified the Court's use of remedial power. Contrary to the 
Realist thesis, the Court found substantive rights not merely in the 
explicit directives of the Constitution, but also in the policy underlying 
the directive: "The notion of 'implying' a remedy, therefore, as ap-
plied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process whereby the fed-
eral judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial 
remedies according to reasons related to the substantive social policy 
embodied in an act of positive law."64 
When Justice Harlan used the terms substantive right and substan-
tive social policy he did not mean that the damage action created in 
Bivens could only be justified by being necessary to preserve the plain-
tiff's Fourth Amendment rights. 65 Instead, Harlan relied on evidence 
of "substantive social policy" to impose some limit to the Court's use 
of discretion to enforce constitutional provisions. He acknowledged 
that the Court was making law, 66 but implied that courts' discretion-
ary power would not intrude on legislative prerogatives because courts 
would apply only traditionally available remedies and only to further a 
substantive social policy. In this sense, the field of traditionally avail-
able remedies served for Harlan the same function as does the com-
mon law negligence action for a state court using a statute as a 
standard of care: it circumscribed a general area of judicial responsi-
bility in which the courts could further the policies embodied in 
statutes. 
C. Rights Without Remedies: The Restrictive Approach 
1. Cort v. Ash: The Beginning of the End 
The Court did not long favor the liberal approach to creation of 
implied rights of action. In 1975, the Court ushered in a new test for 
determining whether implied rights of action existed. In Cort v. Ash, 61 
the plaintiff claimed that the corporation in which he held stock had 
62. 403 U.S. at 397. 
63. 403 U.S. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
64. 403 U.S. at 403 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
65. This was the view of both the Second Circuit and the government; the majority and 
Justice Harlan rejected the argument. 403 U.S. at 397 (majority opinion); 403 U.S. at 406-07 
(Harlan, J., c0ncurring). 
66. 403 U.S. at 402..()3 n.4, 405 n.6, 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
67. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
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engaged in illegal political activity. The director of the corporation 
had included a politically oriented mailing with the stockholders' divi-
dend checks, allegedly in violation of a federal criminal statute forbid-
ding corporations from making contributions to federal election 
campaigns. The Court held that the statute did not imply a right of 
action for damages. Justice Brennan's majority opinion created a new 
four-part test for the creation of implied rights of action: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the stat-
ute was enacted," that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor 
of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, ex-
plicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, 
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action 
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern 
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action 
based solely on federal law?68 
The plaintiff failed even the first element of this test, since the 
Court found that the statute was not enacted for the "especial benefit" 
of corporations' shareholders; their protection was "at best a secon-
dary concern" of the statute.69 From a Realist perspective, however, 
the remarkable aspect of Cort was that, had the plaintiff met the first 
part of the test, the Court would have proceeded with the other three 
parts, especially the element of congressional intent. 70 Cort implied 
that the mere existence of a right was not enough to enable the plain-
tiff to sue, and that courts would not enforce rights absent congres-
sional intent to create a remedy. The Realist theory of rights and 
remedies establishes that to speak of a legal right without a remedy is 
nonsense: the state's ultimate actions, through rules, measure the lim-
its of both. Either the congressional intent test or the especial benefit 
test may have made sense by itself, but when the Court split the differ-
ence by using both tests, it reintroduced a concept the Realists had 
banished from legal theory: the unenforceable right. 
2. The Ascendancy of the Congressional Intent Test 
The extent to which the Court had accepted the idea of unenforce-
able rights became evident in Davis v. Passman, 71 another constitu-
tional implied right of action case, decided eight years after Bivens. 
The plaintiff, a woman fired from her job on a Congressman's staff, 
brought an action against him under the Fifth Amendment. The 
Court found a cause of action, justifying its decision in part on the 
Court's special responsibility for enforcing the Bill of Rights. How-
68. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). 
69. 422 U.S. at 81. 
70. See Foy, supra note 37, at 564-65. 
71. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
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ever, the Court distinguished a plaintiff's rights under a statute from 
the plaintiff's ability to enforce the statute: 
Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is 
entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these rights and obliga-
tions, to determine in addition who may enforce them and in what man-
ner. For example, statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in 
complex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through 
private causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through al-
ternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions or other public 
causes of action[ ]. 72 
Implied right of action doctrine after Cort and Davis thus incorpo-
rates the notion that courts can restrict remedies without impairing 
rights. The Court should have recognized that statutory rights are not 
"embedded" in complex regulatory schemes, that regulatory schemes 
- the mechanisms available for real, substantive relief - are them-
selves rights, and that the limitations on those schemes also limit the 
rights those schemes create. 73 As Davis demonstrates, however, the 
Court instead chose to engage in a discourse about whether rights 
were enforceable. 
In a series of statutory implied right of action cases after Cort, the 
congressional intent branch of the Cort inquiry increasingly displaced 
the competing notion that rights could be enforced without specific 
congressional intent. Although the Court continued to apply Cort, it 
began to focus exclusively on the factor of congressional intent regard-
ing remedies. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 74 the Court charac-
terized the question of whether an implied remedy was available as 
one of "statutory construction," concerning whether "Congress in-
tended to make a remedy available to a special class of litigants."75 
Cannon upheld the cause of action, over a strong dissent from Justice 
Powell. 
Justice Powell's reluctance to enforce congressional purposes be-
came more influential, and the Court further restricted implied rights 
of action in subsequent cases. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 16 held 
that section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not cre-
ate an implied right of action against an accountant for improper au-
diting of financial records which the Act required to be disclosed. In 
rejecting the plaintiff's claim, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the 
Court demonstrated his belief that even the mixed approach of Cort 
improperly favored implied rights of action. He argued that although 
Cort required a four-factor test, "the Court did not decide that each of 
72. 442 U.S. at 241 (citations omitted). 
73. See infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text. 
74. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
75. 441 U.S. at 688. 
76. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
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these factors is entitled to equal weight."77 "The central inquiry," as 
Justice Rehnquist reformulated the test, was "whether Congress in-
tended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of 
action."78 
Touche Ross effectively shifted the Court's emphasis away from the 
notion that the existence of a statutory right necessitated some form of 
action to enforce that right. Whether a right existed or not, Touche 
Ross dictated that congressional intent would control an individual's 
ability to bring a lawsuit. Thus, although Justice Brennan concurred 
in the holding of Touche Ross, his separate opinion argued that the 
statute "clearly [did] not 'create a federal right in favor of the 
plaintiff.' "79 
California v. Sierra Club, 80 decided two years later, returned to the 
Cort test. In Sierra Club, the Court refused to find an implied right of 
action under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act. The Court 
of Appeals had determined that the plaintiffs met the especial benefit 
test of Cort because Congress had enacted the RHAA for the benefit of 
those who would suffer "special injury" from unauthorized obstruc-
tion of a navigable waterway. Justice White, reversing the Court of 
Appeals, stated that such a view made the "especial benefit" require-
ment meaningless. He then recharacterized the issue: "The question 
is not simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress 
intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries."81 Justice 
White's opinion held on the first element of Cort: it focused on intent 
to benefit the plaintiffs, not on congressional concern for the mechan-
ics of lawsuits. 82 As long as the intent to benefit the plaintiff was clear 
enough, the ability to sue on the statute would follow. 83 
77. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575. 
78. 442 U.S. at 575. 
79. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66, 78 (1975)). 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) [hereinafter TAMA], followed 
immediately after Touche Ross and solidified its holding. Citing Cannon and Touche Ross, Jus-
tice Stewart stated that "what must ultimately be determined" in an implied right of action test 
"is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted." TAMA. 444 U.S. at 15-16. 
The TAMA and Touche Ross approach was echoed in the next term by Universities Research 
Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981). 
80. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
81. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294 (citation omitted). 
82. Needless to say, the four Justices who concurred only in the judgment argued that Justice 
White had placed "somewhat more emphasis on Cort v. Ash" than was appropriate in light of 
Touche Ross. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
83. Somewhat evasively, Justice White professed to accept that the focus of the implied right 
of action test was whether Congress "intended to create a private right of action," Sierra Club, 
451 U.S. at 293, but then argued that this intent was assessed through the Cort factors, the most 
prominent of which was the intent to benefit the plaintiff! Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 
450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981), had offered the same convoluted approach to Cort, but focused on 
specific intent to provide for private lawsuits. Coutu's handling of Cort was duplicated in Texas 
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981). 
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The approach of the Sierra Club Court is an isolated exception. 
While never overruled, Cort has become obsolete as the Court has fo-
cused exclusively on congressional intent to create judicial remedies. 
Thompson v. Thompson 84 demonstrates the extent to which the con-
gressional intent approach has become dominant. Thompson held that 
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 85 which required states to 
afford full faith and credit to a valid child custody determination of 
another state, did not create a private cause of action in federal court 
to determine which of two conflicting state decrees was valid. The 
majority stated that a focus on congressional intent "does not mean 
that we require evidence that Members of Congress ... actually had in 
mind the creation of a private cause of action."86 This view prompted 
Justice Scalia to argue, with Justice O'Connor's endorsement, that 
such a statement was inaccurate in that "we effectively overruled the 
Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross . ... "87 
Thompson was apparently a clear case, with no dissenters. Yet 
even the suggestion that the Court could allow a private cause of ac-
tion without its having been actually in the mind of the legislature 
drew objections from two members of the Court. The line of cases 
since Touche Ross, then, demonstrates that the Court has abandoned 
the notion that a plaintiff can be entitled to a judicial remedy simply 
by having a right. The legislature must also specifically intend that the 
right be accompanied by a remedy to be enforceable in court. 
D. Theoretical Implications of the Congressional Intent Test 
As formulated in Cort, the test for implied rights of action seemed 
to embrace nonsensical notions; the need for legislative intent that 
rights be enforceable, and the concomitant notion of unenforceable 
rights, directly contradicts sound Realist concepts of rights. This sec-
tion reexamines the elements of Cort to demonstrate that the especial 
benefit test and the inquiry into congressional intent stem from two 
competing, irreconcilable concepts of the conditions under which a 
court may enforce the law. The especial benefit test maintains the 
traditional prerogative of the judiciary to enforce rights without con-
gressional authorization. The congressional intent test, on the other 
hand, would take away from the judiciary its role as enforcer of the 
rule of law. Either the congressional intent or the rights element of 
Cort eventually had to predominate, because in mixing the two ele-
ments, Cort embraced a contradiction. 
One can draw an analogy between the dispute over the creation of 
84. 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988). 
86. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179. 
87. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring). Citing Justice Scalia's reasoning, 
Justice O'Connor also concurred separately. 484 U.S. at 188 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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implied rights of action and the choice between two possible standards 
for determining whether an enforceable contract exists. Requiring 
that Congress intend to allow parties to bring lawsuits to enforce their 
rights is like requiring that, in addition to intending to make a con-
tract, parties to a contract also intend to allow themselves to be sued. 88 
One might argue that a party should not be legally liable under a con-
tract unless the party signs a statement specifically affirming his intent 
to submit possible disputes to the jurisdiction of a court. The more 
plausible argument, however, is that the availability of court enforce-
ment is so implicit in the notion of contractual right as to obviate any 
need for such a specific clause. As with any legal right, a contractual 
right as a matter of legal terminology implies the availability of court 
procedures to enforce the right. 89 
Under the first element of Cort, Congress creates rights for a party 
when it enacts a law for the especial benefit of that party.90 As in 
Marbury v. Madison, 91 the especial benefit element of Cort determines 
whether the relevant statute establishes a commitment by the state to 
the plaintiff. Courts can imply a right of action, because a legal com-
mitment to certain beneficiaries of the law - and the likelihood of 
justifiable reliance on that law by its beneficiaries - can be inherent in 
the relationship of the law to the social problem the legislature in-
tended it to address. In tum, the notion of judicial review originating 
in Marbury suggests that if a right exists, a remedy must be available. 
Without a judicial remedy a putative right is unenforceable, and there-
fore not a right at all; in such a case the state undermines the rule of 
law by failing to keep its commitments. If rights are really to exist, a 
remedy must be available regardless of whether Congress "intended" 
that the rightholder be able to enforce her right. 
In contrast, the intent branch of the Cort inquiry rejects the notion 
that rights of action can be implied at all. It posits that a lawsuit may 
be brought only when Congress intends that a specific party be able to 
enforce a specific statutory interest. The status of the party as a mem-
ber of a general class Congress intended to benefit is irrelevant to this 
88. The former doctrine that gave special status to sealed documents provides an example of 
this reasoning; the seal alerted the parties to the legal consequences of their statements. See 
FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 15-17. 
89. The "implied" view of the creation of rights becomes superfluous in the face of clear 
indications of intent in either direction. If Congress authorizes certain parties to bring lawsuits 
as private attorneys general, it is unnecessary to inquire, as Cort does, whether the statute also 
creates rights. Similarly, if Congress has explicitly precluded private enforcement, it has clearly 
limited any substantive right which would otherwise exist. 
90. In light of this Note's earlier discussion of the implicit role of the state in all private 
rights, the wording of this first element of the Cort test is revealing. Although a private right of 
action purports to define the legal relations between two private parties, in fact the test is whether 
the state has passed a law for the benefit of the plaintiff. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying 
text. 
91. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
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inquiry. Obviously, such requirements for greater specificity must 
stop somewhere: not even the harshest critics of implied rights of ac-
tion would suggest that Congress must, for example, denote the au-
thorized enforcers of a statute by name and address. Nonetheless, the 
intent branch of Cort requires that before a court can enforce a law, 
Congress must explicitly consider and approve the court's doing so.92 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the congressional intent test would 
seriously undermine the role of the judiciary in enforcing the rule of 
law as that role was established by Marbury v. Madison. This is evi-
dent when one imagines how the congressional intent test would have 
affected Marbury itself. The relevant "statute" was the appointment 
of Marbury by former President Adams, and the especial benefit to 
Marbury was quite clear, as Marbury was specifically named in the 
commission. Justice Marshall found that the rule of law demanded a 
private cause of action. If he had relied solely on the congressional 
intent test, however, Justice Marshall would have inquired whether 
President Adams specifically intended - and just forgot to mention 
- that Marbury would be entitled to a private judicial remedy to 
compel the delivery of the commission. 
At its farthest extreme, then, the intent branch of the Cort inquiry 
reverses Marbury's traditional presumption that the courts will be 
available to uphold the rule of law and that legal rights will be enforce-
able as a matter of course. Instead, the legislature that passes a law 
must also intend that the law be enforceable, as if a law has no inher-
ent enforceability merely because it is law. The intent of Congress is 
highly relevant to the question of whether Congress has created a 
right, just as the intent of the parties is crucial to the question of 
whether they have formed a contract, but the first element of the Cort 
test already captures this aspect of congressional intent. To demand 
that a statute satisfy the additional element of intent, and require that 
the legislature specify the conditions under which a statute can be en-
forced, is tantamount to removing the judiciary's power to enforce leg-
islative commitments on the judiciary's own authority. 
E. Explaining the Retreat from Implied Rights of Action 
1. The Rejection of Common Law Power 
However extreme the theory behind the congressional intent test 
might be, a closer examination of the implied right of action cases 
reveals that nothing so grand as the rule of law itself is really at issue 
in the Court's retreat from implied rights of action. Instead, what 
emerges from an analysis of these cases is that the restriction on im-
92. Given Congress' control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts, one may argue that a 
statute should not be enforceable in court unless it evidences specific congressional intent to 
extend jurisdiction. The alternative, more traditional rule requires that so long as a general pro· 
vision authorizes jurisdiction, a court does have the power to enforce the law. 
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plied rights of action is aimed at curtailing the court's common law 
role in making law, not its role in enforcing it. 
The vast majority of implied right of action cases decided by the 
Court in the period between Cort and Thompson concerned not just 
any remedy, but causes of action for damages. Unlike Marbury in 
Marbury v. Madison, the plaintiffs in these cases were usually not re-
questing official compliance with the law. They were requesting mon-
etary compensation for past violations of the law. The damages they 
requested were not necessary to uphold the rule of law, but were elab-
orations on the scheme of deterrence established by Congress. 
The decision whether to augment a statutory scheme by providing 
new remedies involves a number of policy considerations.93 The justi-
fication for courts' creation of implied rights of action, therefore, de-
pends not on notions of fairness and the rule of law, but on a higher-
order policy choice regarding the distribution of authority among in-
stitutions. A court may create damage remedies on a common law 
basis, as a means of making law; state courts do so regularly. As dis-
cussed in section II.A, however, the common law powers of a federal 
court are different from those of state courts. When the Court incre-
mentally ruled out the creation of damage actions based on federal 
statutes it was rejecting the proposition that federal courts possessed 
the discretionary policymaking authority to supplement a statutory 
scheme by creating damage remedies. 
In this respect, Cort's short-lived four-part test was also aimed, like 
Justice Harlan's notion of "traditionally available remedies,"94 at carv-
ing out an area of common law authority in which federal courts could 
create new rights based on general statutory purposes. The Cort test 
did not really determine whether Congress had created a right. In-
stead, it set forth an institutional theory that a federal court could 
appropriately make law when a damage remedy would further a stat-
ute's purpose, when the Court could discern some congressional in-
tent, and when the area was not reserved to state law. At the same 
time, however, Cort was vulnerable to changing theories of institu-
tional competence. The current Supreme Court has resolved the de-
bate over judicial lawmaking in favor of declining to exercise the 
discretionary authority Cort sought to preserve.95 
2. Damage Remedies and the Rule of Law 
The rejection of a common law role in creating damage remedies, 
however, need not imply a wholesale rejection of the courts' power to 
administer such remedies where they are necessary to uphold the rule 
93. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1296-300. 
94. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
403 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
95. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 807-09 (1989). 
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of law. Just as there is a difference between bald policymaking and 
statutory interpretation, there is also a difference between the creation 
of a damages remedy as a matter of policy, and as a matter of fairness. 
An entitlement conveyed by a law is meaningless unless accompanied 
by some means to compensate the plaintiff for deprivation of that enti-
tlement. Thus, just as a right to injunctive relief can arise without 
explicit legislative intent, in the manner contemplated by Marbury, so 
too can a right to damages arise without explicit legislative intent. 
In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 96 
the Court demonstrated that its willingness to create damage remedies 
to preserve rights has survived the curtailment of implied rights of 
action. The plaintiffs in McKesson were wholesale liquor distributors 
who had been subjected to a discriminatory liquor tax that violated the 
Commerce Clause. Florida law had required that the plaintiffs pay the 
tax before they could challenge it through litigation; thus, after the tax 
was declared unconstitutional, the plaintiffs sought compensatory re-
lief. 97 Characterizing the question as whether, under such circum-
stances, "prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of 
federal law," the Court answered no.98 It held that where prepayment 
of a tax is required, "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-look-
ing relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation."99 
Perhaps the restrictive attitude toward implied rights of action evi-
dent in Thompson v. Thompson Ioo has foreclosed the creation of simi-
lar damage remedies outside the constitutional context. Nonetheless, 
the Court would appear to lack a clear justification for such a distinc-
tion: the duty of the judiciary to enforce the rule of law extends not 
only to constitutional but also to statutory rights. Indeed, since in the 
statutory context the legislature retains the ability to remove the sub-
stantive basis for the right of action by changing the law, judicial au-
thority to enforce statutory rights is far less problematic than the 
unreviewable power to enforce the Constitution. IOI Moreover, statu-
tory and constitutional rights cannot be completely separated, because 
a flagrant disregard by the state of its statutory obligations to a plain-
tiff often amounts to a deprivation of due process. Io2 
Even if damage actions to uphold statutory rights remain a viable 
possibility, however, two factors are likely to make the courts more 
reluctant to find that due process or the rule of law necessitates a cause 
" 
96. 110 s. Ct. 2238 (1990). 
97. See 110 S. Ct. at 2251. 
98. 110 S. Ct. at 2247. 
99. llO S. Ct. at 2247. 
100. 484 U.S. 174 (1988); see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
101. Foy, supra note 37, at 579-81. 
102. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n.17 (1984). 
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of action for damages than they are to find similar entitlements to pro-
spective relief. First, a statutory right entitling the plaintiff to both 
injunctive relief and damages is simply a more valuable right; a plain-
: tiff is always in a better position when she can secure both future com-
pliance and compensation for past wrongs. A statute can reasonably 
entitle a plaintiff to prospective relief, yet not provide for retroactive 
compensation. Similarly, a right to damages might be required for 
egregious or bad faith violations of a statute, but not for ordinary 
noncompliance.103 
Second, granting a damages remedy may require resolution of a 
wider range of issues than granting injunctive relief. Especially where 
rights of uncertain economic value are involved, a damages remedy 
may require the courts to make policy by setting the level of damages 
and therefore creating corresponding levels of deterrence. Even where 
a statute requires some right to damages, a court may seek legislative 
input as to the range of damage remedies. The difficult determination 
of monetary equivalents might legitimately be reserved to the legisla-
ture, and the courts might step in only where the alternative would be 
legislative inaction and the complete absence of a damages remedy. 104 
For either reason, the courts would likely require a strong showing 
of statutory entitlement to justify a cause of action for damages. The 
series of cases from Cort to Thompson leaves open the possibility that 
courts will create damage actions where necessary to uphold the rule 
of law, but will apply a higher standard to test whether due process 
requires monetary compensation, as opposed to prospective relief. If 
rights and remedies are identical, court must ask what rights - pro-
spective, compensatory, or otherwise - the statute creates, not merely 
whether a statute creates rights in the abstract. 
3. Implied Rights of Action and Standing 
This section applies the rationalization of the Court's implied right 
of action cases developed in the previous section, by comparing the 
Court's jurisprudence of implied rights of action with a closely related 
doctrine, the doctrine of standing. The Court's series of implied right 
of action cases has been paralleled by a development in the doctrine of 
standing to force official compliance with the Constitution and laws 
103. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1214 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that a 
damage remedy was not intended absent exceptional circumstances, such as bad faith); Quacken-
bush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 
(1984) (finding that Congress intended some relief for harm caused by school official miscon-
duct); see also Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 463 U.S. 582, 597-98 (1983) (White, J.) 
(denying compensatory relief for unintentional statutory violation); cf Zinermon v. Burch, 110 
S. Ct. 975, 982-86 (1990) (discussing test for determining inadequacy of state tort remedy neces-
sary to establish deprivation of due process). 
104. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983). 
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under the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). 105 The AP A pro-
vides for judicial review of administrative action, upon demand by ap-
propriate beneficiaries of regulatory schemes. The section authorizing 
judicial review states: "A person suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof."106 
Where a plaintiff may invoke a statute or regulation to determine 
the outcome of judicial review of agency action (or inaction 107), that 
statute or regulation has, in functional terms, created a private 
right. 10s Thus, although the AP A is phrased in terms of "standing" to 
receive "judicial review," it has been recognized that a test for stand-
ing collapses into an inquiry into the existence of a cause of action for 
injunctive relief against the agency. The determination as to the plain-
tiff's standing amounts to a preliminary assessment of the merits of 
the plaintiff's claim.109 
In fact, the AP A language contains a phrase resembling the test for 
the existence of a right in Cort v. Ash: it makes those who have suf-
fered "legal wrong" eligible to sue. The modem interpretation of the 
AP A has not developed around this term, however. Courts have in-
stead relied on the "adversely affected or aggrieved" justification for 
standing. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp, 110 the Court rejected the argument that absent an explicit stat-
utory authorization of standing for those "aggrieved by agency ac-
tion," a plaintiff must show a "legal wrong" to establish standing. In 
place of a "legal wrong" test, Data Processing set forth a three-part test 
for standing. The Court first noted that the "cases" and "controver-
sies" provision of Article III required that the plaintiff demonstrate an 
"injury in fact." Second, in order to meet the "aggrieved" require-
ment of the AP A, the plaintiff had to be "arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question." Finally, Congress must not have foreclosed 
the possibility of judicial review based on the pertinent statute.111 
In a 1987 decision, Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 112 the Court 
recharacterized the holding and rationale of Data Processing. Justice 
105. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1988). 
106. 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1988). 
107. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1208-16, 1267-89 (discussing "rights of initia-
tion" to force agency action). 
108. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. 
109. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 234-39 (1988); Lee 
A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for 
Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 427-29 (1974). 
110. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
111. 397 U.S. at 152-56. 
112. 479 U.S. 388 (1987). 
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White's opinion stated that the "adversely affected or aggrieved" lan-
guage could have been read as an injury in fact requirement, but that 
the Data Processing Court had been uncomfortable with the proposi-
tion that "Congress actually intended to extend standing to all those 
suffering injury in fact." He then characterized the "arguably within 
the zone of interests" test as a "gloss on the meaning of§ 702."113 
The gloss was necessary, Justice White argued, because reading the 
"adversely affected or aggrieved" language as establishing an injury in 
fact standard would have made the grant of standing unacceptably 
broad.114 
By using the zone of interests test as a gloss on section 702, how-
ever, the Court has essentially revived the "legal wrong" standard of 
section 702 in a liberalized form. Just as Cort v. Ash used the especial 
benefit test to determine whether the statute created a right, Clarke 
and Data Processing use the zone of interests test to insert a "legal 
wrong" requirement into the injury in fact test. 115 In both cases, the 
relevant statute requires some course of action from the defendant (in 
standing cases an agency, in implied rights of action a private party), 
but the courts are unwilling to have this law enforced by anyone who 
might desire to bring a lawsuit. The zone of interest and especial bene-
fit tests limit the class of potential plaintiffs to those whom the statute 
was genuinely intended to protect.116 Cort characterized the especial 
benefit test as determining whether the statute created a right in the 
plaintiff.117 Simply as a matter of plain meaning, a violated right 
should be identical with a legal wrong.118 
113. 479 U.S. at 395-96. 
114. 479 U.S. at 395-96. 
115. See Fletcher, supra note 109, at 234-39. As Fletcher argues, the zone of interests test 
amounts to a preliminary assessment of whether the plaintiff's legal rights have been violated. 
Obviously, where a plaintiff's legal rights have been violated, one can just as readily say that the 
plaintiff has suffered legal wrong. 
116. As Professor Fletcher points out, the Court has used "injury in fact" to perform this 
screening function, even though in reality, anyone who desires to bring a lawsuit is injured in fact 
by not being able to bring it. Although speaking in terms of injury in fact, the Court has really 
been concerned with injury in law-that is, those kinds of injury recognized by the law as impor-
tant enough to be the subject of a lawsuit. Id. at 229-34; cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative 
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 965 (1988) (The "cru-
cial threshold question" determining whether an Article III "case" exists is "whether the sub-
stantive law creates rights or interests that are assertable by a particular plaintiff."). 
Similarly, Professor Monaghan compares the APA standing inquiry with the inquiry as to 
the existence of a right within the meaning of section 1983. He states that 
[t]he section 702 litigant must still show that she is adversely affected "within the meaning 
of the relevant statute," a requirement that, after Lujan, seems identical to the Court's insis-
tence in Golden State that the section 1983 plaintiff must establish that she is more than 
simply an "incidental" beneficiary of a federal statute. 
Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 233, 258 (1991). 
117. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
118. The Court's rejection of the "legal wrong" language in Data Processing was apparently 
attributable to the narrow interpretation the Court had previously imposed on the doctrine. 
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The Clarke Court noted this parallel with implied right of action 
doctrine. Instead of regarding the two tests as equivalent, however, 
the Clarke opinion purported to illustrate the leniency of the zone of 
interests test established in Data Processing by contrasting it with the 
Cort test. 119 The Court stated that when applying the "threshold bur-
den" - the first element of the Cort test - to an implied right of 
action, Cort was "clearly requiring more" than would be required by 
the zone of interest test.120 
One reason a court might require "more" from a plaintiff seeking 
to establish a claim against a federal agency, as opposed to a claim 
against a private party, relates to the nature of the defendant. A pri-
vate litigant's suit against an agency may reflect a private right of ac-
tion which has simply been channeled through an agency. A 
successful suit against an agency may result in the agency's granting 
relief to the plaintiff that resembles that granted by a court at the end 
of a successful implied right of action case.121 Situations in which a 
statute will justify a court in ordering an agency to take action, how-
ever, are relatively rare.122 The greater range of responses available to 
the agency in ordinary cases justifies a looser test for a right of action 
against an agency than one against a private party.123 
The difference between administrative and private defendants, 
however, does not fully explain the Clarke requirement that a plaintiff 
show "more" to establish a private right of action than to establish 
standing. In some cases, standing to challenge agency action does ap-
proximate the effects of a private right of action. Aside from the pri-
vate right of initiation just mentioned, standing may also approximate 
a private right of action when the agency action being challenged takes 
a highly specific form. For example, in Clarke the Court found the 
plaintiffs to have standing to challenge the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency's decision to grant to two national banks a license permitting 
them to establish or purchase discount brokerage subsidiaries. 124 
Since the brokerages had to be licensed to operate and the plaintiffs 
could challenge the decision to grant the license, the plaintiffs 
effectively had a private right of action to prevent the brokerages from 
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1987); see also JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL 
IDENTITY 39-45 (1978) (explaining doctrinal implications of "legal interest" test). 
119. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 & n.16 (1987). Clarke also 
reiterated a view previously discussed in the context of the implied right of action cases, that the 
right of judicial review ultimately depends on whether Congress intended to permit the suit. 479 
U.S. at 399. 
120. 479 U.S. at 401 n.16. 
121. Such action through an agency is referred to as a "private right of initiation." See 
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1208-12, 1267-89. 
122. See id. at 1205-06, 1267-71; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-35 (1985). 
123. See VINING, supra note 118, at 107-09. 
124. 479 U.S. at 403. 
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operating - a claim that ultimately failed. 125 Indeed, in some cases 
the asserted private right of action has resembled standing so closely 
that the court has regarded the two terms as virtually inter-
changeable.126 
Another difference between the private lawsuit and administrative 
contexts is therefore needed to explain Clarke's requirement for 
"more" to establish a private right of action than to show standing. 
This difference lies in the fact that most private rights of action request 
retroactive relief in the form of damages.127 Where a suit requests 
only prospective relief, the difference between the private lawsuit and 
standing contexts may be fairly small, because in order for the statute 
to create a right to judicial relief, it must restrict agency discretion. 
This restriction on discretion may suffice to establish either a right of 
initiation, through judicial review of agency inaction, or a private right 
of action, through direct resort to the courts.12s 
Clarke's demand that a plaintiff show "more" to establish an im-
plied right of action, therefore, is also attributable to the justifiably 
more stringent requirements governing a claim that goes beyond pro-
spective relief and seeks damages. The Court has at times assumed a 
cause of action for prospective relief, without even going through an 
implied right of action analysis.129 Yet damages are different. Be-
cause a right to damages is a more valuable entitlement, a greater de-
gree of legislative commitment to the plaintiff should be necessary to 
establish that right. The cases restricting implied rights of action can 
thus be interpreted not as undermining the authority of the courts to 
enforce the rule of law, but as requiring a greater showing to justify 
damage awards than would be required to attain standing in an action 
for prospective relief. 
125. 479 U.S. at 409. 
126. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 
455-56 (1974). 
127. See VINING, supra note 118, at 107 (stating that unlike actions for prospective relief, 
implied damage actions raise "problems peculiar to the restructuring of the past"). 
Just as this Note went to print, the Court declined an opportunity to endorse this reasoning in 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 60 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S., Feb. 26, 1992). Franklin holds 
that the implied right of action created by Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), 
see supra notes 74-75; infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text, extends to compensatory as 
well as injunctive relief. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4172. Justice White's opinion states that once an im-
plied cause of action exists, "we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Con-
gress has expressly indicated otherwise." 60 U.S.L.W. at 4169. Nonetheless, because Franklin 
involved extreme, intentional discrimination - sexual harassment and coercive intercourse -
the Court may have relied on the previously discussed distinction between intentional and unin-
tentional violations. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4168; see supra note 103 and accompanying text. Moreover, 
there was clear evidence in Franklin that Congress had contemplated the availability of compen-
satory relief by abrogating state immunity from actions based on the statute involved. 60 
U.S.L.W. at 4171. 
128. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1312-14, 1321. 
129. See infra notes 218-19. 
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4. Separation of Powers: Justice Powell's Dissent in Cannon 
The Court's opinions rarely explored any other basis for its curtail-
ment of implied rights of action, aside from opposition to discretionary 
enforcement and the aversion to damage remedies in particular. One 
exception came in Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago. 130 This section addresses Justice Powell's arguments and 
concludes that they fail to provide any independent grounds for not 
enforcing statutory rights. 
In Cannon, Justice Powell argued that implied rights of action had 
jurisdictional significance: 
By creating a private action, a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily 
extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to 
resolve. This runs contrary to the established principle that "[t]he juris-
diction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by 
judicial interpretation" . . . and conflicts with the authority of Congress 
under Art. III to set the limits of federal jurisdiction.131 
Taken on its face, Justice Powell's argument makes the questiona-
ble suggestion that there can be no general federal question jurisdic-
tion. Instead, each statute is taken as implicitly conveying jurisdiction 
to the federal courts in order to allow them to hear a claim based on 
the statute. Surely, however, the courts in Cannon and the other im-
plied right of action cases already had jurisdiction over the cases sim-
ply because the plaintiffs based their claim on a federal right; "the 
failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the 
merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction."132 
What Justice Powell meant was that a grant of jurisdiction conveys 
authority to enforce law, not to make it; 133 he was concerned about 
judicial policymaking in the absence of congressional approval. 134 The 
availability of private actions can entail substantial social costs, both in 
the government's direct expenses of administering the statute, and in 
the disruption of the regulated activity. 135 Justice Powell argued that 
130. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
131. 441 U.S. at 746 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 
341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951)). 
132. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). One of Justice Powell's defenders has argued 
that if general federal question jurisdiction justifies federal courts in inferring rights of action, 
"there would be a private right of action under every federal statute, because bringing an action 
for violation of the statute would raise a federal question ..•. " Mark D. Loftis, Note, Implied 
Rights of Private Action Under Federal Statutes: The Continuing Influence of Justice Powell's 
Cannon Dissent, 5 J.L. & POL. 349, 366 (1989). The fallacy of this argument can be seen by 
comparing it with the situation in a state court. A state court has general jurisdiction over all 
legal claims. Yet obviously not every state statute creates an implied right of action! 
133. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1225-26; see also Weinberg, supra note 95, at 
832 n.156; Monaghan, supra note 116, at 238, 240-44. 
134. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 43, at 948. 
135. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1296-1300 (stating, for example, that "[r]emedial 
injunctions .•. pose serious dangers of overdeterrence"); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Ac-
tion, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 572-78 (1981) (arguing that private securities fraud actions create 
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courts must decline to imply causes of action absent explicit authoriza-
tion to do so because otherwise the political branches would abdicate 
their duty to address these social costs to the courts. Legislatures 
would pass a statute, but leave the intended level of enforcement of the 
statute indeterminate. The difficult policy choices surrounding private 
enforcement of the statute would be passed to the courts, instead of 
keeping them in the political branches.136 Justice Powell argued that a 
requirement of specific intent to create a cause of action would force 
Congress to deal up front with the social consequences of private en-
forcement of legislative mandates. 
However powerful Justice Powell's objections to judicial poli-
cymaking may be, they offer no reason to oppose a court's nondiscre-
tionary enforcement of a statute it interprets as creating rights. True, 
where Congress has established a remedial scheme, access to that re-
medial scheme may fix the limit of the rights created.137 Where the 
terms of a statute clearly commit the state to act for the benefit of the 
plaintiff, however, some level of enforcement is necessary simply as a 
matter of fairness and the rule of law.138 · 
The facts of Cannon itself suggest that the majority of the Court 
believed that the private remedy created there was compelled as a mat-
ter of fairness, and did not depend on the Court's exercising poli-
cymaking power. Cannon involved a private right of action based on 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which directly forbids 
gender discrimination by educational institutions: "No person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance .... " 139 
Justice Powell's opinion implied that despite the declarative lan-
guage of the statute, the Court should not hold the legislature to its 
word by finding a private right of action. He argued that "[a]t least in 
the view of Congress, the fund-termination power conferred on HEW 
is adequate to ensure that discrimination in federally funded colleges 
and universities will not be countenanced."140 Yet the plain language 
of the statute left Justice Powell's objections vulnerable to the major-
ity's argument that the statute created a right to be free from discrimi-
unpredictable risks and create overenforcement of securities laws); George D. Brown, Of Activ-
ism and Erie - The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal 
Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 645 (1984) (arguing that "in the context of grant-in-aid programs 
private damages actions may seriously diminish grantee resources and detract from the overall 
achievement of program goals"). 
136. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743-48 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
137. See infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). 
140. 441 U.S. at 748-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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nation, not a right to petition an administrative agency to stop funding 
the discriminatory activity. 141 Despite Justice Powell's objections to 
judicial policymaking, the Court seemed to conclude that if it did not 
create an implied right of action it would fail to enforce the statute: 
The language in these statutes - which expressly identifies the class 
Congress intended to benefit - contrasts sharply with statutory lan-
guage customarily found in criminal statutes, such as that construed in 
Cort ... and other laws enacted for the protection of the general public. 
There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of indi-
vidual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmis-
takable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on 
discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition 
against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions en-
gaged in discriminatory practices.142 
Where a private right of action is necessary to effectuate a right, 
Justice Powell's separation of powers concerns are inapposite. If a 
court enforces compliance with the clear requirement of a statute, the 
court does not bear the responsibility for the social consequences of 
enforcement; it has the traditional defense that it is simply enforcing 
the law as it has been written.143 As argued in section 11.D, the ability 
to maintain the rule of law by enforcing the commitments of the state 
expressed in law is essential to the traditional power of judicial 
review.144 
* * * 
The Court's rejection of the especial benefit element of the Cort test 
in the implied right of action cases dealing with damage remedies can 
thus be explained without resorting to a theory of judicial review that 
undermines Marbury v. Madison. The Court was not refusing to en-
force the statutes in question but was instead refusing to create rights 
to compensatory relief. Yet the Court could have - and should have 
- reached its results without falling into a discourse of unenforceable 
rights. As the next section demonstrates, when the Court was faced 
with the same jurisprudential issues in the context of a statute that 
spoke explicitly in terms of rights, the Court's earlier vocabulary be-
gan to create a good deal of confusion. 
141. Justice White argued, however, that Congress had indeed intended only to create a right 
of access to administrative proceedings. See 441 U.S. at 729 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Congress "rel[ied] on the authority of the Federal Government to enforce the terms under which 
federal assistance would be provided"). 
142. 441 U.S. at 690-93 (footnote omitted). The Cannon Court did proceed to apply the 
other elements of Cort; in contrast, this Note would have subsumed the other elements of Cort 
into one inquiry as to whether the statute had truly created a right. See infra notes 177-90 and 
accompanying text. 
143. Cf JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 8-9 (1980) (summarizing "interpre-
tivist" argument that when the judge enforces the language of the Constitution, "the judges do 
not check the people, the Constitution does"). 
144. See also supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
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III. SECTION 1983: A NEW SOURCE OF RIGHTS OF ACTION? 
This Part discusses the Court's jurisprudence of rights in cases 
where section 1983 applies. Section III.A describes the Court's hold-
ing that section 1983 creates a remedy for the deprivation of any fed-
eral statutory right and discusses the early difficulty in the application 
of section 1983's "rights" language. Section III.B discusses the 
Court's integration of the Cort v. Ash implied right of action analysis 
with its test for the existence of a right under section 1983. Elaborat-
ing on the identity between rights and remedies established earlier, 
section IIl.B further argues that the Court's current doctrine that sec-
tion 1983 creates a presumption that rights will be enforced repeats 
the mistake of Cort in accepting the notion of unenforceable rights. 
Section III.C argues that the conventional interpretation of section 
1983 as creating a damages remedy should be rejected in favor of an 
interpretation that reads the term rights in section 1983 to require a 
preexisting implied statutory right to damages relief before section 
1983 may be invoked. 
A. Maine v. Thiboutot and the Protection of Statutory Rights 
During the same period in which the Court restricted implied 
rights of action under federal statutes against private parties, it ex-
panded the availability of causes of action against state officials based 
on the same statutes. Beginning with Maine v. Thiboutot, 145 the Court 
began to hold that even though a particular statute would not give rise 
to an implied right of action, the statute might create rights sufficient 
to enable the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit under section 1983. In 
Thiboutot, the plaintiffs had successfully challenged a welfare benefits 
regulation adopted by the State of Maine; they sought to invoke sec-
tion 1988 to recover attorney fees for the proceeding.146 Thiboutot 
first explicitly recognized that the rights referred to in section 1983 
could arise from any federal statute, not just the Constitution and civil 
rights laws.141 The decision followed an exhaustive debate over the 
peculiar legislative history of the "and laws" language that had taken 
place in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization. 148 Perhaps 
because of this focus on the "and laws" debate, the Thiboutot opinion 
overlooked the question as to when a law creates rights cognizable 
under section 1983.149 
145. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
146. 448 U.S. at 2-3; see supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
147. 448 U.S. at 5-8. 
148. 441 U.S. 600 (1979). 
149. Thiboutot generated a great deal of comment addressing the relationship between 
§ 1983 and the implied cause of action. Little of it discussed the question of whether the statutes 
involved created rights. See George D. Brown, Whither Thiboutot? Section 1983, Private En-
forcement, and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DEPAUL L. REv. 31 (1983); Owen M. Field, Note, 
The Application of Section 1983 to the Violation of Federal Statutory Rights - Maine v. 
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In the term following Thiboutot, the Court did confront, in a lim-
ited manner, the issue of how statutes create rights. In Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 150 the Court held that a "bill of 
rights" provision contained in a cooperative funding program for the 
developmentally disabled did not create a right sufficient to give rise to 
a cause of action under section 1983. The Court stated that only a 
clear, mandatory provision, backed by sanctions for noncompliance, 
could create rights.151 
Pennhurst's holding that only a clear statutory mandate could cre-
ate "substantive rights"152 clarified the section 1983 inquiry some-
what. Yet in light of this Note's earlier discussion of standing, it is 
clear that Pennhurst only provided half of a two-part test. Where a 
plaintiff claims that a statute has given her rights it is insufficient to 
ask whether the statute's provisions are mandatory or enforceable. 
One must also ask the question of standing: With respect to whom is 
the statute "mandatory" - that is, who can enforce it?153 
Although Pennhurst did not address this "standing" aspect of the 
rights question, it did indicate in dictum that even if a right did exist, 
no remedy would be available under section 1983 if "the express rem-
edy contained in [the statute] is exclusive."154 This alternative chal-
lenge to the availability of the section 1983 remedy became the focus 
in the next section 1983 case, as a comprehensive enforcement scheme 
was found to exist in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National 
Sea Clammers Association. 155 In Sea Clammers, the Court rejected 
the plaintiff's contentions that the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act created an implied right of action under the Cort test. 156 
Although the issue had not been briefed, the Court then addressed the 
possibility that a cause of action would exist under section 1983.15' 
The Court concluded that the private enforcement provisions of the 
Act evidenced a congressional intent to deny private enforcement 
under section 1983.158 Justice Powell's opinion reasoned that because 
Thiboutot, 30 DEPAUL L. REv. 651 (1981); Douglas W. Jessop, Note, Implied Private Rights of 
Action and Section 1983: Congressional Intent Through a Glass Darkly, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1439 
(1982); Cass R Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 394 (1982); Paul Wartelle & Jeffrey H. Louden, Private Enforcement of Federal Statutes: 
The Role of the Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HAsrtNGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1982). 
150. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
151. 451 U.S. at 15-18. 
152. 451 U.S. at 28 n.21. 
153. See supra notes 20, 108-09 and accompanying text. 
154. 451 U.S. at 28. 
155. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
156. 453 U.S. at 18. 
157. 453 U.S. at 19. 
158. The FWPCA provided for citizen suits enabling private citizens to obtain injunctive 
relief against violations of the Act. The citizen suit provisions, however, required plaintiffs to 
give notice to the Environmental Protection Agency, the state, and the defendants before bring-
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Congress itself has authorized lawsuits under section 1983, "separa-
tion of powers concerns are not present in a § 1983 case," and that 
courts did not need to look for specific indications of congressional 
intent. 159 Instead, section 1983's "express congressional authoriza-
tion" gave rise to a presumption that Congress intended private en-
forcement; this presumption could be overcome only by the presence 
of a comprehensive enforcement scheme. Although the Sea Clammers 
Court indicated that rights should be easier to enforce through section 
1983 than through implied rights of action, it shifted the Court's focus 
away from the basic question regarding the test for the existence of 
section 1983 rights. 
Because of the lack of attention given to the issue by the Supreme 
Court in Thiboutot, Pennhurst, and Sea Clammers, the lower courts 
were left to determine which statutes would be read as creating rights 
enforceable under section 1983. It was obvious that implied rights of 
action and section 1983 rights were related, but it was unclear how to 
reconcile them. The result, in the words of one commentator, was a 
"crazy quilt of inconsistent decisions in which one can find support for 
virtually any proposition about statutory claims under section 
1983.''160 
Over the past several years, however, a consensus has begun to 
emerge regarding the interaction of implied rights of action and sec-
tion 1983. Relying on the first element of Cort v. Ash, the courts have 
considered as creating rights those statutes that make directives in-
tended for the especial benefit of the plaintiff. The effect of Thiboutot, 
where the right concerned is one violated under color of state law, has 
been to reinstate the especial benefit element of the Cort implied right 
of action test. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit to ap-
proach the question of rights of action under section 1983 by asking 
whether the federal statute involved creates rights within the meaning 
of Cort. In Boatowners and Tenants Assn. v. Port of Seattle, 161 the 
plaintiffs were an association of pleasure craft owners who sued the 
city of Seattle for imposing unreasonable rates for moorage at the 
city's harbor, contrary to the provisions of the River and Harbor Im-
provements Act.162 The court held that "at least the existence of a 
federal right found under the analysis of the first factor in Cort ... is 
required in order to support a section 1983 action," arguing that only 
ing suit. The plaintiffs sought to use the implied right of action device to circumvent these re-
quirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988). 
159. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20-21; see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 110 S. Ct. 
2510, 2517 n.9 (1990) (discussing Sea C/ammers). 
160. Brown, supra note 149, at 33. 
161. 716 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1983). 
162. 33 u.s.c. §§ 540-633 (1988). 
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if such a right existed would there be a presumption of enforceability 
under section 1983.163 
B. Rights and Statutory Schemes: Rebutting the Section 1983 
''Presumption" 
The Ninth Circuit analysis164 was taken up in the October 1989 
term by Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 165 and Wil-
der v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 166 as these cases at last squarely ad-
dressed the issue of when a statute creates a right. In Golden State 
Transit, the Court held that the preemptive effect of the National La-
bor Relations Act created a right in the plaintiff taxicab company to be 
free from interference by the City of Los Angeles in the company's 
collective bargaining with its employees.167 The majority opinion first 
acknowledged that a plaintiff cannot sue a state actor under section 
1983 for just any failure to comply with federal law. Justice Stevens 
began his analysis by noting that "[s]ection 1983 speaks in terms of 
'rights, privileges, or immunities,' not violations of federal law";168 
this language was repeated in Wilder. 169 Justice Stevens then stated 
that in determining what statutes create rights under section 1983, the 
Court looks to the rights that may exist under the first element of the 
Cort test. 
Without explicitly saying so, Justice Stevens rejected some earlier 
views of the Thiboutot doctrine that had stated that section 1983 estab-
lishes a cause of action against any state official who violated any fed-
163. 716 F.2d at 673. Subsequent cases have adhered to this approach; see Clallam County 
v. Washington State Dept. ofTransp., 849 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 1008 
(1989); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987); Coos Bay Care 
Ctr. v. Oregon Dept. of Human Resources, 803 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as moot, 484 
U.S. 806 (1987); Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Assn. v. Hawaiian Homes Commn., 739 F.2d 
1467 (9th Cir. 1984). 
164. Other courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit rule as well. See Victorian v. Miller, 813 
F.2d 718, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (citing Cannon instead of Cort); New York Airlines v. 
Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1444-46 (D. Mass. 1985); Balf Co. v. Gaitor, 534 F. Supp. 
600, 604 (D. Conn. 1982). But see First Natl. Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Natl. Bank, 636 F.2d 
195, 198 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981) (limiting § 1983 to claims "in the 
nature of the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act"); Yapalater v. Bates, 494 F. Supp. 1349, 
1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), ajfd., 644 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982) 
(§ 1983 suit creates remedy where injury "flows from a state's violation of governing federal 
law"). 
165. 493 U.S. 103 (1989). 
166. 110 s. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
167. 493 U.S. at 108-13. In an earlier ruling on the same dispute, the Court had established 
that the NLRA, by occupying the field of labor relations, had preempted state regulation that 
would interfere with the collective bargaining process between a union and an employer. See 
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986). The case discussed in 
this Note involved the attempt by the company to invoke§ 1983 to obtain compensatory relief. 
493 U.S. at 105. 
168. Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 106. 
169. Wilder. 110 S. Ct. at 2517. 
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eral statute - seemingly whether the statute secured a right for the 
plaintiff or not. Again, because Thiboutot had avoided the issue, ear-
lier cases tended to equate violations of federal law with violations of 
plaintiff's rights.17° Golden State Transit clarified the existence of a 
threshold requirement that a federal statute first create rights before it 
becomes enforceable under section 1983. Even if a statute makes the 
clear command required by Pennhurst rather than a hortatory state-
ment, unless this command is clearly for the benefit of the plaintiff in 
question, no right of action arises. 
In Wilder, the plaintiffs based their section 1983 claim on the Bo-
ren Amendment to the Social Security Act, which governs the rates of 
reimbursement that states participating in the Medicaid program must 
pay to health care providers.171 As originally enacted, the statute gov-
erning reimbursement rates had required that health care providers 
receive "the 'reasonable cost' of hospital services actually provided, 
measured according to standards adopted by the Secretary [of Health 
and Human Services]."172 In an attempt to allow states greater flexi-
bility in establishing rates of reimbursement, Congress adopted the Bo-
ren Amendment, amending the reimbursement provisions to require 
that the State use reimbursement rates "which the State finds, and 
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and eco-
nomically operated facilities .... " 173 The Wilder Court held that this 
language created a "right," and that health care providers could seek 
enforcement of "reasonable and adequate" rates of reimbursement in 
court through section 1983.174 
The Wilder opinion reiterated the rule expressed in previous cases 
that if a right exists under the Cort test, section 1983 creates a pre-
170. Several opinions seemingly ignored the requirement that the relevant statute first create 
a right before giving rise to a cause of action under § 1983. See Wright v. City of Roanoake 
Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987) (Thiboutot "held that§ 1983 was available to 
enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of the State."); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 
770 F.2d 184, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Section 1983 •.. creates an express federal cause of action 
against state officials for violations of federal law ..•. "); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 510 
(1st Cir. 1983) (broad reading of Thiboutot that§ 1983 "provides a remedy for violations by state 
officers of any federal law" is limited by Sea C/ammers doctrine of intent to preclude enforce· 
ment). In effect, these courts spoke as if§ 1983 created standing to challenge any state official's 
violation of any federal law. Regarding the conduct of federal officials, the Supreme Court's 
"zone of interest" test was fashioned specifically to avoid such an expansive grant of standing 
under the APA. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
Thus, when he invoked the Cort test, Justice Stevens drew on Justice O'Connor's dissenting 
characterization of the § 1983 test in Wright. Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 106. The court 
has in effect rejected the view expressed in Amon D. Siegel, Note, Section 1983 Remedies for the 
Violation of Supremacy Clause Rights, 97 YALE L.J. 1827, 1836-37 (1988), that all statutory 
commands create rights for all plaintiffs. 
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
172. 110 S. Ct. at 2515 (quoting Pub. L. 89-97, § 1902(13)(B), 79 Stat. 346). 
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
174. 110 S. Ct. at 2525. 
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sumption that the plaintiff may bring a lawsuit to enforce this right. 
However, the defendant can rebut this presumption with a showing 
that Congress intended to preclude section 1983 enforcement by enact-
ing its own comprehensive regulatory scheme.175 If the defendant can-
not rebut this presumption, the plaintiff can maintain an action. Thus, 
the Court has treated section 1983 as requiring a compromise between 
the rigid requirements of the congressional intent test established by 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 176 on the one hand, and the liberal 
remedial doctrine originally indicated by the Thiboutot decision on the 
other. 
The Court continues to embrace a contradiction, however, by ac-
knowledging the possibility that a statute will create a right, but that 
the presence of a comprehensive enforcement scheme will render this 
right unenforceable. 177 This two-step analysis is unnecessary and 
could be subsumed entirely within the inquiry as to exactly what 
rights a statute and its accompanying administrative scheme have cre-
ated. The Court should simply adopt the view that to the extent Con-
gress designs administrative machinery to leave discretion in the hands 
of an administrative agency, it creates no rights enforceable outside 
the administrative context. 
This notion of rights is illustrated by the statutory scheme of reme-
dies accompanying the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA).178 The EAHCA enacts a purportedly substantive stan-
dard: it entitles all handicapped children to a "free appropriate public 
education" (FAPE).179 The Act requires that each handicapped child 
receive an "individualized education plan" (IEP) that will develop his 
or her educational potential.180 In interpreting these open-ended 
terms, the Supreme Court has been very hesitant to specify any sub-
stantive standards that the EAHCA might impose, arguing that the 
primary goal of the EAHCA is to give handicapped students access to 
a set of procedures designed to address their needs. 181 As the Court 
interprets the EAHCA, instead of setting any fixed standard, "the Act 
imposes no clear obligation upon recipient States beyond the require-
ment that handicapped children receive some form of specialized edu-
cation .... " 182 The EAHCA relies on a procedural machinery that 
employs teachers, school administrators, administrative review 
175. 110 S. Ct. at 2523. 
176. 442 U.S. 560 (1979); see supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
177. Because as a doctrinal matter the "preclusion" of the section 1983 remedy constitutes 
the implied repeal of a statute, one commentator has questioned the soundness of the Sea Clam-
mers test. See Sunstein, supra note 149, at 418-21. 
178. 20 u.s.c. § 1400-1485 (1988). 
179. 20 u.s.c. § 1412(1) (1988). 
180. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18) and (19) (1988). 
181. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189-90, 204-08 (1982). 
182. 458 U.S. at 195. 
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boards, and ultimately the courts, to ensure a meaningful implementa-
tion of the F APE standard. 
The Act, therefore, does not confer a right to a fixed standard of 
education, but instead confers a right of access to a procedural ma-
chinery through which the IEP is determined. Because Congress 
designed the EAHCA from the first to give the plaintiff a right of ac-
cess to a procedural machinery with no guarantee of outcome, it cre-
ated only a limited right. That right consists of the requirement that 
those who administer the EAHCA direct their efforts toward certain 
broad statutory goals and comply with the restrictions of certain mini-
mum procedural requirements. In sum, the "remedies" created by the 
EAHCA are really "rights"; the provisions for enforcement of the 
rights in question actually measure the rights created.183 
The limited right conferred by the EAHCA, however, gives stu-
dents an associated right to good faith efforts on the part of the various 
officials who determine the IEP, meaning attention to whatever sub-
stantive goals the act establishes.184 This right has not depended on 
any affirmative indication of an intent to create lawsuits. Thus, courts 
have recognized that although no fixed substantive requirement may 
be enforced, a wholesale failure to comply with the procedures re-
quired by the EAHCA may constitute a per se violation of the Act, 
which may give rise to a claim for damages. 185 
The Court has at times acknowledged a similar line of reasoning in 
its implied right of action cases. For example, in T.LME Inc. v. 
United States, 186 the Court held that the Motor Carrier Act187 did not 
create an implied right of action to recover charges paid by a shipper 
to a carrier under an unreasonable rate filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. Although the Motor Carrier Act imposed a 
"duty" on interstate motor carriers to "establish, observe, and enforce 
just and reasonable rates," and declared "unjust and unreasonable 
charge[s]" to be "unlawful," the Court held that parties could not en-
183. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1221 ("[A]s both an analytical and a practical 
matter, the procedures for implementing a regulatory program cannot be separated from its 
substance."). 
184. See Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 1983); Ander-
son v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1214 (7th. Cir. 1981). 
185. Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 628-32 (5th Cir. 1986); Hall v. 
Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985). There is currently a debate over 
whether a failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the EAHCA renders the result-
ing IEP per se substantively inadequate. See Doe v. Alabama State Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 
662-63 nn.11-12 (11th Cir. 1990); Muth v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 127 (3d Cir. 
1988), revd. on other grounds, Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). Whereas violations of the 
substantive provisions of the EAHCA do not create a right of action for damages, however, 
violations of procedural requirements have been held to create damage liability. Evans v. Dis-
trict No. 17, 841 F.2d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 1988); Jackson, 806 F.2d at 631-32. 
186. 359 U.S. 464 (1959). 
187. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1940) (repealed 1978). 
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force this duty in court. 188 "[L]anguage of this sort in a statute which 
entrusts rate regulation to an administrative agency,'' the Court 
stated, "in itself creates only a 'criterion for administrative application 
in determining a lawful rate' rather than a 'justiciable legal right.' " 189 
The Court further held that the right of access to the administrative 
procedures created by the Motor Carrier Act displaced previously ex-
isting common law rights, due to the fact that Congress had "appar-
ently sought to strike a balance between the interests of the shipper 
and those of the carrier, and that the statute cut significantly into pre-
existing rights of the carrier .... "190 
Finding that a comprehensive administrative scheme "precludes" 
private enforcement, then, is simply another way of saying that a stat-
utory scheme has created only a limited right, and that some areas 
have been reserved for administrative discretion. The "presumption" 
in favor of private enforcement created by section 1983 should be an 
empty one; any limit imposed on private enforcement by an adminis-
trative scheme limits the right itself. When the Court assesses whether 
a statute creates rights, it should link rights and remedies by taldng 
into account the entire enforcement scheme associated with the 
statute. 
The actual treatment of the presumption by the Court confirms 
this view, and indicates that the Court itself regards the presumption 
and rebuttal test essentially as a formality. In the years since Sea 
Clammers the Court has not articulated the force of the presumption 
in favor of private enforcement supplied by section 1983. In the Wil-
der case, the Court reiterated that "' "[w]e do not lightly conclude 
that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy" 
for the deprivation of a federally secured right.' " 19 1 Aside from the 
requirement that the defendant show "by express provision or other 
specific evidence"192 that private enforcement was foreclosed, the 
Court gave no indication of what lightly means. 193 The strength of the 
188. 359 U.S. at 469 (quoting 49 U.S.C. §§ 316 (b) and (d) (1988)). 
189. 359 U.S. at 469 (quoting Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 
341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951)). 
190. 359 U.S. at 479. 
191. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2523 (1990) (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. 
at 423-24 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984))), 
192. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. 2523 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423). 
193. Indeed, the Court continues to rely on a flawed precedent to support the very existence 
of the presumption. Wilder quoted Wright for its point regarding § 1983's "presumption." 479 
U.S. at 423-24 (1987). Wright in tum had quoted Smith v. Robinson. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). The 
Smith Court, however, had refused to "lightly conclude" that Congress "intended to preclude 
reliance on section 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim" - that is, a right 
created by the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than a statutory right. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012 
(emphasis added). The issue of whether the statute in question had foreclosed private enforce-
ment under § 1983 was not even presented in Smith, and the Smith Court noted that the circuits 
generally agreed that Congress had foreclosed enforcement of the statutory right through § 1983. 
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1008 n.11. 
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presumption supplied by section 1983 would therefore seem to turn on 
the individual Justice's views of implied rights of action. In fact, after 
Sea Clammers some observers felt that Justice Powell had simply 
merged the implied right of action and section 1983 inquiries, and cer-
tainly Justice Powell's opinion gave no guidance as to the force of the 
presumption.194 
Scholarly analyses of the section 1983 "presumption" also seem to 
indicate that the ultimate determination as to private enforcement is 
no different under section 1983 than under the implied right of action 
test. For example, in a 1982 article195 Professor Cass Sunstein pro-
posed that a statute creating a federal right also create a cause of ac-
tion under section 1983 unless there is a showing of "manifest 
inconsistency between the statutory enforcement scheme and a private 
cause of action."196 One example of such "manifest inconsistency" 
would be a situation in which "Congress intended to concentrate en-
forcement responsibilities in a particular institution."197 No doubt 
these and other considerations Sunstein listed are useful for determin-
ing whether a private right of action has been created, but their appli-
cation to the specific language of section 1983 seems questionable. 
Sunstein's list in fact resembles a set of considerations proposed in an 
earlier article on implied rights of action. 198 Yet in the area of implied 
rights of action, no presumption exists that needs to be "refuted" if a 
court is to deny a cause of action. Like Justice Powell, Sunstein seems 
to believe that private enforcement under section 1983 should be coex-
tensive with implied rights of action, but while Justice Powell dislikes 
implied rights of action, Sunstein favors them. Yet both have a point, 
which can be justified by applying the insights gained in Part H's dis-
cussion of implied rights of action to the definition of the term rights in 
section 1983. 
C. Merging Implied Rights of Action and Section 1983 
1. Reading "Rights" Realistically 
The Realist thesis demonstrates that the true measure of rights is 
the actual conduct of the state through remedies. Applied to implied 
rights of action, the Realist thesis refutes the notion that the rights a 
statute creates can differ from the remedies that the judiciary affords 
to plaintiffs in its role as upholder of the rule of law. Some statutes or 
constitutional provisions may create rights to compensatory relief for 
their violation. Other statutes or constitutional provisions, however, 
194. Brown, supra note 149, at 42-46. 
195. Sunstein, supra note 149. 
196. Id. at 426. 
197. Id. at 431. 
198. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1289-94, 1321. 
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may commit the state to affording only prospective relief, in which 
case a court will not recognize a cause of action for damages, unless 
the court exercises common law authority to create new rights. Other 
statutes may create rights by entitling plaintiffs to access to adminis-
trative schemes with no guarantee of outcome. 
The impossibility of separating rights from remedies compels the 
conclusion that a statute or constitutional provision only creates rights 
if a plaintiff can enforce that law in court. Therefore, section 1983's 
"presumption" should be replaced with a simpler test: a statute 
should create rights for purposes of section 1983 if and only if that 
statute would also create an implied right of action. 
The uncertain quality of the presumption created by recent inter-
pretations of section 1983 resulted from a semantic trap the Court laid 
for itself in the retreat from implied rights of action. As the Court cut 
back on implied rights of action, it distinguished rights and remedies 
and engaged in the anomalous discourse of "unenforceable rights." 
Yet in the context of section 1983, the statute specifically uses the lan-
guage of rights, and guarantees the existence of rights of action to en-
force them. The issue of private enforcement of a statute therefore 
turns on a single question: Does the statute create rights? 
In Wilder and Golden State Transit, the Court began to incorpo-
rate this insight by focusing its section 1983 inquiry on the issue of 
whether the relevant statute or constitutional provision created rights. 
The most recent section 1983 rights case, Dennis v. Higgins, 199 moved 
even further in a Realist direction. In Dennis, the Court held that the 
dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition against state regulations that 
discriminate against interstate commerce creates rights enforceable 
under section 1983. The availability of an injunctive remedy under the 
dormant Commerce Clause was established long before Dennis. 200 In 
a Realist manner, the Court relied on its previous recognition of a 
dormant Commerce Clause remedy to establish the existence of a sec-
tion 1983 right; it noted that "individuals injured by state action that 
violates [the dormant] Commerce Clause may sue and obtain injunc-
tive and declaratory relief."201 As in Golden State Transit, because the 
Court had long held that plaintiffs could sue under the dormant Com-
merce Clause, the inference that the dormant Commerce Clause cre-
ated rights was irresistible. 
Nonetheless, the Court has thus far passed up the opportunity to 
take the next logical step and purge its section 1983 jurisprudence of 
oddities such as "unenforceable rights" or "rights without remedies/' 
The recent refocusing of section 1983 jurisprudence on the term rights 
offers the Court an opportunity to eliminate the untenable distinction 
199. 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991). 
200. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
201. 111 S. Ct. at 870. 
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between rights and remedies and to read section 1983 realistically. A 
cause of action should exist under section 1983 if and only if an im-
plied right of action would exist under the relevant statute. 
Moreover, this identity between implied rights of action and sec-
tion 1983 should extend to the specific relief requested: if a statute 
would not create an implied right of action for damages, section 1983 
should not provide a damage remedy either. Section 1983's require-
ment that the plaintiff be deprived of a right should be read to require 
an external source of authority, beyond section 1983 itself, for the 
existence of a right to be compensated in damages. The Court should 
apply only the "especial benefit" branch of the Cort inquiry to the 
issue of whether a right exists, and if a right exists, a remedy should 
follow as it did in Marbury. 202 
The doctrine that section 1983 does create a damage remedy where 
one would not otherwise exist, of course, is well established. Nonethe-
less, this rule may have only resulted from the paucity of discourse as 
to the meaning of the term right in section 1983. Courts have accepted 
the term right in section 1983 uncritically, despite the recognition in 
other contexts that "[t]here is no more ambiguous word in legal and 
juristic literature."203 As this Note has demonstrated, the creation of 
a damage remedy in the context of implied rights of action has little to 
do with "rights" per se, but is simply an exercise of common law 
power. A statute might create "rights" to prospective relief, but not to 
compensatory remedies. Under this same logic, a statute that does not 
create a "right" sufficient to imply a damage remedy ought not create 
a "right" to receive damages under section 1983 either. 
2. Restricting Damage Remedies Under Section 1983 
Currently, a number of doctrines already limit the effect that sec-
tion 1983 has on creating monetary liability for the deprivation of fed-
eral rights. First, the Eleventh Amendment generally protects states 
from the imposition of monetary liability in the federal courts, and the 
Supreme Court has held that section 1983 did not abrogate the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.204 Second, in Will v. Michigan De-
partment of State Police, the Supreme Court held that states them-
selves are not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983 and 
202. The argument that injunctive relief should be no more readily available under section 
1983 than it would be outside the section 1983 context is a relatively uncontroversial one. The 
section 1983 cases recently before the Court have not been concerned with the existence of a 
section 1983 remedy where no other exists. Indeed a number of recent section 1983 cases have 
been primarily driven by the plaintiffs' attempts to invoke section 1983 to obtain an award of 
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in contexts where the availability of other remedies is well 
established. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 
867-68 (1991); Siegel, supra note 170, at 1844-45. 
203. 4 POUND, supra note 17, § 118, at 56. 
204. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1979). 
1102 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 90:1062 
therefore are not subject to section 1983 liability.205 Third, state offi-
cials are protected from liability by either absolute or qualified immu-
nity. 206 Finally, the liability of municipalities and other local 
governments has been limited by the requirement that the deprivation 
of rights must have resulted from the execution of an official policy, or 
have been "visited pursuant to governmental 'custom.' "207 
Under the current reading of section 1983, unless an immunity 
doctrine applies, the damage remedy must be available where a right 
has been violated, regardless of the merits of the underlying statutory 
claim. The all-or-nothing nature of section 1983 prevents the courts 
from holding, as they sometimes have in the implied right of action 
context, that a statute requires one remedy but not another.208 Much 
of the doctrinal complexity of section 1983 immunity cases results 
from judicial attempts to avoid the force of section 1983's supposedly 
unequivocal requirement that damages be awarded as compensation 
for statutory violations. As Professor Christina Whitman had stated, 
"Although the effect of these doctrines in some cases has been to dis-
pose of section 1983 actions altogether, the opinions suggest that it is 
the damage remedy that often is most troubling to the courts."209 
Several members of the Court have at times attempted to restrict 
the creation of section 1983 damage remedies, but their failure to 
adopt a Realist interpretation of the term rights frustrates their efforts 
to ground their opposition to damage remedies in the language of sec-
tion 1983 itself. As a result, the effort to restrict monetary compensa-
tion produces inconsistent and spurious arguments about the existence 
of rights. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles210 demon-
strated that some Justices, while asking whether section 1983 creates 
rights, really have in mind the issue of damage relief. Dissenting from 
the Court's recognition of a section 1983 cause of action, Justice Ken-
nedy maintained that other remedies existed, so that"§ 1983 does not 
provide the exclusive relief that the federal courts have to offer."211 
The previous opinion of the Court in the same litigation, Justice Ken-
nedy argued, had recognized a different remedy: "Our omission of 
any discussion of§ 1983," Justice Kennedy stated, "perhaps stemmed 
205. 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 
206. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 
(1974); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 43, at 1292-303. 
207. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see also City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
208. Cf. PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 
AND RELATED STATUTES 126-28 (1988) (noting that "questions concerning the nature and 
scope of the compensatory objective in various contexts .•. have largely been avoided by the 
recognition of official immunities and by other limitations on damage actions under section 
1983"). 
209. Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 19 MICH. L. REV. 5, 42 (1980). 
210. 493 U.S. 102 (1989). 
211. Golden State Transit, 493 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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from a recognition that plaintiffs may vindicate Machinists preemp-
tion claims by seeking declaratory and equitable relief in the federal 
district courts through their powers under federal jurisdictional 
statutes."212 
Justice Kennedy appears to argue that the mere existence of fed-
eral court jurisdiction over preemption claims gives the plaintiff a fed-
eral remedy. Yet this is surely incorrect.213 Even if the plaintiff 
establishes jurisdiction over the asserted claim, she must still demon-
strate the existence of a claim upon which relief may be granted. In 
addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act Justice Kennedy men-
tioned214 only gives the court the power to determine "rights and 
other legal relations."215 Thus, unless the preemptive effect of the stat-
ute in question in Golden State Transit had created rights, no relief 
would have been available under the declaratory judgment statute 
either. 
In an analogous context, the Court has discussed the availability of 
injunctive relief precisely in terms of rights. In Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, 216 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the federal courts over a 
declaratory action to enjoin enforcement of state regulations that were 
allegedly preempted by BRISA. The Court noted: 
It is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to 
enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights. See Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160-162 (1908). A plaintiff who seeks injunctive 
relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-
empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which 
the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.217 
As in Ex Parte Young itself, whenever a court provides relief on 
the basis of a federal statute or constitutional provision, it necessarily 
decides that the plaintiff has both a right and a cause of action under 
that law.218 In order to make a reasonable argument that relief was 
available independently of section 1983, then, Justice Kennedy must 
212. 493 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
213. This would call into question the well-established doctrine that the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to determine the merits of a claim is broader than the power to grant relief where a 
valid claim is asserted. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Monaghan, supra note 116, at 238, 
240-41. 
214. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988). 
215. 28 U.S.C. § 220l(a) (1988). 
216. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
217. 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
218. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 43, at 1181; Monaghan, supra note 116, at 241. 
Indeed, past reliance on general jurisdictional provisions to resolve hard-to-classify cases in the 
manner advocated by Justice Kennedy forced the Court to recognize the existence of a cause of 
action under § 1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). In his Thiboutot opinion, Justice 
Brennan noted that because statutory claims had been decided on the merits under the court's 
pendent jurisdiction, "§ 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory cause of action because ... 
the SSA affords no private right of action against a State." Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6. Relief could 
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have assumed that the preemptive effect of the NLRA created a cause 
of action. 219 Yet this implied the anomalous conclusion that the pre-
emptive effect of the NLRA created a federal right, unless one was 
speaking in terms of rights under section 1983. The real debate in 
Golden State Transit was not over whether the preemptive effect of the 
NLRA created any rights at all, but whether it created a right to dam-
ages that went beyond the established right to prospective relief. Jus-
tice Kennedy must have felt that the policy concerns underlying the 
preemption doctrine did not warrant a damage remedy. Yet the cur-
rent failure to link the rights a statute creates with the remedies it 
would independently authorize prevented Justice Kennedy from 
grounding his view in the language of section 1983. 
Interpreting section 1983 in the manner proposed here would not 
eliminate damage remedies for violations of statutory and constitu-
tional rights; it would simply restrict them to the extent their imple-
mentation is discretionary and not required by the rule of law. Courts 
may still create damage remedies in appropriate circumstances.220 In-
deed, the federal courts have enforced damage remedies independently 
of section 1983 in the past. In 1978, in Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 221 the Supreme Court did away with the immunity of munici-
palities from lawsuits under section 1983 - an immunity that had 
been established by Monroe v. Pape. 222 In the years between the 
Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics 223 and the decision in Monell the lower courts 
had engaged in a debate over whether a municipality was directly lia-
ble under the Fourteenth Amendment for the violations of constitu-
tional rights that were not redressable under section 1983. 
On the eve of the Monell decision, the majority of the circuits con-
not issue simply from jurisdictional statutes; a right had to exist, and that right was therefore 
redressable through § 1983. 
219. Monaghan, supra note 116, at 241. Professor Monaghan argues that "Kennedy's asser-
tion that a remedy other than relief under section 1983 would be available seems unjustified," 
and that "surely Justice Kennedy did not assume that the Golden State plaintiffs had an implied 
right of action under the NLRA." Id. at 240-41 & n.55. Given the existence of precedent sup-
porting the availability of relief in a case not involving section 1983, see New York Tel. Co. v. 
New York Labor Dept., 440 U.S. 519 (1979), and Justice Kennedy's reliance on this case, 493 
U.S. at 119, neither of Professor Monaghan's statements seems justifiable. Despite the Court's 
failure to articulate the implied right of action analysis in New York Tel. Co., noted by 
Monaghan, supra note 116, at 238, it would hardly be the first time the Court effectively created 
an implied right of action while explicitly relying only on a jurisdictional provision. See supra 
note 218; Michael G. Collins, ''Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope 
of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1507-33 (1989); see also Siegel, supra note 170, at 1843 ("In 
practice ... section 1983 injunctions will make little difference. Without section 1983, a 
supremacy clause plaintiff typically sues for a declaratory judgment ..•. Injunctions usually 
follow as a matter of course."). 
220. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
221. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
222. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
223. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing Bivens). 
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sidering the question had found a cause of action against a municipal-
ity directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.224 Just as the trend 
among the circuits was becoming clear, the Court's decision in Monell 
made section 1983 applicable to municipalities. Eliminating the auto-
matic availability of damage remedies under section 1983 would renew 
the debates conducted in these pre-Monell cases. It would shift the 
focus away from all-or-nothing issues regarding immunity and require 
the court to enforce damage remedies only when such remedies are 
demanded as a matter of fairness and the rule of law. 
IV. DEFENDING A REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1983 
This Part discusses two possible challenges to this Note's proposed 
reinterpretation of section 1983. Section IV.A responds to an analysis 
of Wilder and Golden State Transit's jurisprudence of rights that was 
set forth in a recent article by Professor Henry Monaghan, in which 
Professor Monaghan argues for a distinction between "primary" and 
"remedial" law.225 Section IV.A argues that Professor Monaghan's 
characterization of section 1983 as expanding the judiciary's power to 
protect rights is inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison's concept of 
judicial review, that Supreme Court precedent has ruled out 
Monaghan's association of section 1983 rights with "primary law," 
and that the Realist notion of rights refutes any distinction between 
"primary" and "remedial" law. Section IV.B confronts the objection 
that the interpretation of section 1983 suggested by this Note would 
render section 1983 meaningless. Section IV.B establishes that an in-
terpretation of section 1983 which links the definition of rights with 
the test for implied rights of action best accommodates the language 
and history of section 1983 with a modem jurisprudence of rights. 
A. Rejecting the Distinction Between ''Primary" and ''Remedial" 
Law 
1. Competing Visions of Rights: The ''Hohfeldian Gap" and 
Marbury v. Madison 
In a recent article226 Professor Monaghan has recapitulated the 
new doctrine established by Wilder and Golden State Transit. 
Monaghan essentially agrees with the position adopted in Wilder and 
Golden State Transit that although federal courts may possess limited 
224. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 168 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 
F.2d 112, 119-26 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Owen v. City oflndependence, 560 
F.2d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board 
of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 
393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975). 
225. Monaghan, supra note 116. The "primary" and "remedial" terminology is taken from 
Professors Hart and Sacks. See HART & SACKS, supra note 27. 
226. Monaghan, supra note 116. 
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authority to create implied rights of action, section 1983 expands this 
remedial authority in the context of claims against state actors for the 
deprivation of federal rights.227 Monaghan argues that "an important 
distinction exists between primary and remedial law."228 He defines 
primary law (and, derivatively, primary rights) as "the 'authoritative 
directive arrangements' - or more simply, the legal rules - that gov-
ern persons independently of litigation."229 Remedial rights connote 
the "right of action" or court remedy that implements primary 
rights.230 Monaghan argues that "Golden State closes any 
Hohfeldian231 gap between primary federal statutory rights and sec-
tion 1983 rights of action,"232 because both Golden State Transit and 
Wilder "shore up"233 the presumption established in Smith v. Robin-
son 234 against the displacement of a section 1983 cause of action by a 
comprehensive administrative scheme. 235 
It should be obvious that Monaghan's vocabulary of "primary" 
and "remedial" law simply restates the erroneous distinction between 
rights and remedies, and preserves the inconsistent notions of rights 
which have plagued the Court's jurisprudence since Cort v. Ash. In 
order to demonstrate the failure of the "primary" and "remedial" ter-
minology to transcend the contradictions of Cort, one need only focus 
on a fundamental question that Monaghan fails to address: Does the 
rule of law require enforcement of "primary rights"? If the answer to 
this question is yes, then Monaghan's statement that "the existence of 
a primary right entails no necessary conclusion that the right holder 
can sue" and the corresponding implication that a statute like section 
1983 is necessary to fix this state of affairs are deeply disturbing. Con-
trary to Marbury v. Madison, plaintiffs cannot sue to maintain the rule 
of law even in a court of competent jurisdiction, unless Congress so 
provides; we are thus at a loss to explain why a court of proper juris-
diction can compel compliance with primary law where section 1983 
does not apply. If congressional authorization - apart from creation 
of jurisdiction - were necessary to allow courts to enforce the law, 
would the judiciary necessarily have the authority to close the gap be-
tween primary and remedial rights in constitutional actions against 
227. Id. at 250.52. 
228. Id. at 249. 
229. Id. (quoting HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 142). 
230. Id. at 251. 
231. This refers to the Realist legal theorist Wesley N. Hohfeld, who advocated an analytical 
scheme that broke down the term rights into more elemental concepts. For an explanation of 
Hohfeldian terminology, see Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 
163 (1919). 
232. Monaghan, supra note 116, at 248 (footnote added). 
233. Id. at 247-48. 
234. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). But see supra note 193. 
235. See supra notes 175, 191-93 and accompanying text. 
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federal officials? Or similar actions based on statutes? Or in actions 
not against state actors? 
2. Primary Rights as Statutory "Goals" 
If judicial power to enforce a primary right is not necessitated by 
the rule of law - which is Professor Monaghan's more likely meaning 
- then primary rights are really goals; they are aims to which the 
state is not committed. Taking "primary rights" to mean "statutory 
purposes," then Monaghan's suggestion that section 1983 creates a 
right of action to enforce primary rights makes sense. In his view, 
section 1983 gives plaintiffs access to federal courts and allows the 
courts to create remedial rights to enforce statutory purposes. 
This interpretation, however, creates its own problems. First, the 
Court rejected a similar reading of section 1983 in Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital v. Halderman. 236 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for 
the court reasoned that even in the context of section 1983, a right 
required a clear command, not the presence of a statutory goal. The 
plaintiffs in Pennhurst sought to base a section 1983 right on a legisla-
tive "finding" in a funding statute that "[p]ersons with developmental 
disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habili-
tation for such disabilities."237 The Court noted that "'Congress 
sometimes legislates by innuendo, making declarations of policy and 
indicating a preference while requiring measures that, though falling 
short of legislating its goals, serve as a nudge in the preferred direc-
tions.' "238 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the "findings" upon 
which the plaintiffs argued for the existence of a section 1983 "right" 
were laws of this type, and "represent[ed] general statements of federal 
policy, not newly created legal duties."239 
Such "general statements of federal policy" may closely approxi-
mate Professors Hart and Sacks' notion of a primary right relied upon 
by Professor Monaghan. Hart and Sacks define a primary right as 
follows: "Every general directive arrangement contemplates some-
thing which it expects or hopes to happen when the arrangement 
works successfully. This is the primary purpose of the arrangement, 
and the provisions which describe what this purpose is are the primary 
provisions. " 240 It cannot be doubted that the drafters of the "bill of 
rights" provision in Pennhurst hoped that the directives issued in that 
legislation would benefit the handicapped. Yet Justice Rehnquist's 
236. 451 U.S. 1 (1981); see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. 
237. 451 U.S. at 13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1979) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6009 
(1988))). 
238. 451 U.S. at 19 (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970)). 
239. 451 U.S. at 23. 
240. HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 135. 
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point was that no section 1983 rights had been created because no 
command or commitment had actualized the drafters purpose. 
Pennhurst illustrates the jurisprudential flaw in referring to statu-
tory hopes as rights at all. A statute may have both very broad and 
very specific goals. As discussed in Part I, it can be conceded that a 
statute must always be interpreted in the context of its purposes, with-
out admitting that the purpose of a law and the law itself are identi-
cal. 241 In effect, interpreting section 1983 to refer to primary rights 
would return the Court to the common law policymaking role it de-
clined in the context of implied rights of action. An obligation newly 
imposed by a court in a common law adjudication is almost by defini-
tion not an obligation based on rights: it is a new obligation created in 
the context of the very litigation in which it is enforced.242 
3. The Inevitability of Realism 
Obviously, if section 1983 confronts the courts with an unambigu-
ous commission to resume their previous common law role of making 
discretionary judgments and elaborating private rights under statutes, 
then the courts should comply. Likewise, if section 1983 clearly in-
structs the courts to administer damage remedies for violations of stat-
utory interests, the courts must do so. Yet section 1983 speaks only of 
"rights1'; nothing in its language suggests that it is intended to track 
Hart and Sacks' distinction between primary and remedial law, and to 
convey a more extensive authority to fashion remedies than judges 
would have in other areas of the law. 
Moreover, even if one attempted to adopt the categories of primary 
and remedial rights Monaghan suggested, they would likely become 
blurred.243 For example, Monaghan defined primary law as rules that 
"govern persons independently of litigation. "244 Yet the creation of a 
cause of action for damages in one lawsuit - seemingly a matter of 
241. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
242. Indeed, Hart and Sacks' own discussion of the distinction between primary and reme-
dial rights illustrates the untenability of the notion of primary rights. For example, Hart and 
Sacks characterize remedial law as extremely fact-specific and difficult to predict: 
The difficulty and complexity of the general law lie largely on its remedial side. But 
remedial problems turn characteristically on their special facts. It is not usually important 
to be able to anticipate their details. When they do present themselves, there is commonly 
time to study and reflect about them. The kind of law which lawyers need to carry in their 
heads is predominantly primary law. With remedial law, what they need predominantly is 
skill and insight. 
HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 138. 
An issue that turns on the facts, where "skill and insight" are the predominant requirements, 
is generally one in which the rights of the parties simply are not fixed. See supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
243. Witness the creeping Realism, for example, in Professor Monaghan's admission that 
"[i]n reality .•. the existence of the primary right generally presupposes some remedy against the 
duty holder for breach of duty." Monaghan, supra note 116, at 252 n.123. 
244. Id. at 249. 
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remedial law --deters negligent behavior and promotes cost avoidance 
techniques that reach beyond the case at hand. If a cause of action for 
damages thus "govem[s] persons independently of litigation" it could 
reasonably be classified as a primary right. Even if section 1983 guar-
antees a cause of action to enforce primary rights, then, a statute 
would have to create a cause of action for damages before it created 
the primary right necessary to invoke section 1983.245 
The principal objection to a reading of section 1983 that accepts 
the distinction between primary and remedial rights, however, is ex-
• actly the same Realist argument that was made long ago with respect 
to private law: rights and remedies are identical, and the attempt to 
distinguish them is illogical and almost nonsensical. As Marbury v. 
Madison similarly reasoned, courts possess the power to grant reme-
dial rights to enforce primary rights as long as they have jurisdiction, 
but only because affording "remedial" rights only maintains an entitle-
ment created by a "primary" right. Like Legal Realism, the Marbury 
philosophy that a right must be accompanied by a remedy to maintain 
the rule of law is at war with the attempt to draw a distinction between 
rights and remedies, or between primary and remedial rights. 
B. Reading Section 1983 Realistically 
As noted in Part III, an interpretation of section 1983 that would 
deny it any independent remedy-creating effect would be a drastic de-
parture from current doctrine. The Supreme Court currently 
presumes that a private right of action exists under section 1983, be-
cause Congress, in legislating against the background of section 1983, 
is presumed to intend a private remedy. The intent of the 1871 Con-
gress, which enacted a remedy for violations of federal rights, is im-
puted to the present Congress, which has created a right without 
considering remedies. This Note has argued that because rights and 
remedies are identical, the Court should abandon the section 1983 pre-
sumption, and recognize that an entitlement to private enforcement is 
logically coextensive with the existence of rights. Moreover, this Note 
has argued that section 1983 should not automatically create a damage 
remedy, but should apply only where a damage remedy would other-
wise exist. 
The previous sections of this Note have argued for this interpreta-
tion solely on the basis of the modem meaning of the term right. The 
present section attempts to reconcile this approach with the historical 
context of section 1983 and the intent of its drafters. It argues that 
although this Note's proposed interpretation may seem to render sec-
tion 1983 a nullity, it in fact gives effect to section 1983 in several 
ways. Moreover, this section concludes, this Note's proposed inter-
245. Indeed, if one admits the existence of two kinds of rights, there is no reason § 1983 
could not be read to refer to remedial rights. 
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pretation best accommodates the intended effect of section 1983 with 
the changes in legal doctrine that have occurred since the statute's 
passage. 
Even if section 1983 did not make injunctive or damages relief 
available where it would not otherwise exist, section 1983 might still 
have a number of effects. In order to understand these purposes, some 
historical background is needed. After the Civil War, Congress en-
acted the Civil Rights Act of 1866,246 designed to protect the civil 
rights of the newly freed slaves. The Fourteenth Amendment was 
passed in part to quiet those who doubted Congress' power to enact 
such legislation.247 Subsequently, Congress reenacted the provisions 
of the 1866 Act that created criminal liability for civil rights violations 
as portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (known as the Force 
Act).248 In 1871, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act,249 which 
contained the precursor of the modern section 1983. The Klan Act 
was largely concerned with conferring broad-ranging power upon the 
President to combat Klan activities.250 However, the act also created 
in more general terms a civil liability provision to supplement the 
criminal prohibitions of the 1870 Act.251 The statute upon which the 
modern section 1983 is based did not contain the "and laws" language 
and read as follows: 
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be sub-
jected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in 
the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject 
to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies pro-
vided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the [1866 Act]; 
and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their na-
ture applicable in such cases.252 
246. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
247. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV, 1133, 
1143-44 (1977) [hereinafter Developments]. 
248. Ch. 114, §§ 16-18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act protected 
a number of civil rights; its provisions were reenacted by the 1870 Civil Rights Act and survive 
today at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. See Sunstein, supra note 149, at 398-99; see generally Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (discussing legislative history of 1866 Act). 
249. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
250. Developments, supra note 247, at 1153-54. 
251. See Sunstein, supra note 149, at 398-400; see also Developments, supra note 247, at 1155 
(stating that in the debates over the 1871 Act, the precursor to section 1983 "caused the least 
concern, as it only added civil remedies to the criminal penalties established by the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act"). 
252. Ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871). 
() 
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One might suggest that Congress intended section 1983's "shall be 
liable" and "any such law ... notwithstanding" language to foreclose 
the possibility that state officials enforcing laws in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights laws might benefit from 
state sovereign immunity to prosecution. Even before Reconstruction, 
a state official could not assert reliance on an unconstitutional state 
law - that is, one that conflicted with a law enacted pursuant to a 
federal power - as a defense to a civil lawsuit. 253 Yet immediately 
after the Civil War, the extent to which the states remained sovereign 
in the field of civil rights was highly uncertain. Within a few years of 
its enactment, the Supreme Court conservatively interpreted the entire 
scheme of federal rights to preserve in large part the exclusive author-
ity of state governments over civil rights.254 It may be that as the 
federal government entered the traditionally state-ruled province of 
civil rights, Congress felt it necessary to reiterate that reliance on a 
conflicting state law would not immunize the state official.255 
Another effect of section 1983 was to transfer previously existing 
remedies from state courts to federal courts. 256 Congress enacted sec-
tion 1983 before general federal question jurisdiction existed. If the 
cause of action had not been accompanied by a provision for federal 
jurisdiction, lawsuits to enforce the new federally conferred rights 
would have had to be brought in state court.257 Indeed, section 1983 
and its jurisdictional provision were once different clauses of one sec-
tion in the statute.258 Thus, reading section 1983 as merely giving fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over claims that would have existed anyway 
does only a small disservice to the statute, because that was a large 
part of its purpose. 
Even aside from its preservation of these other effects of section 
1983, an interpretation of the "rights" language as authorizing only 
253. See Collins, supra note 219, at 1510-11. 
254. See Developments, supra note 247, at 1141-46, 1156-61. 
255. For an argument that section 1983 was intended to override immunity of state officials, 
see Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's 
Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741, 771-81 (1987). Around the time of Reconstruction, 
the law of immunity was undergoing a slow transition from a rule under which governmental 
officials were held liable for unconstitutional or illegal acts to a tendency to impute the immunity 
of the sovereign to the acts of the official. See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability 
far Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 COLO. L. REv. 1, 21-28, 41-55 (1972). 
256. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80 (1961): 
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right 
in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, 
state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privi-
leges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the 
state agencies. 
365 U.S. at 180. See also Whitman, supra note 209, at 12-14, 21-25 (discussing justifications for 
section 1983's provision of a "supplementary" federal remedy and federal forum). 
257. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 43, at 960-62; Collins, supra note 219, at 1526-29. 
258. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1979); supra note 
252 and accompanying text (quoting original language). 
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those lawsuits that would exist under an implied cause of action test 
may be entirely appropriate, given the changes in the jurisprudence of 
implied causes of action that have taken place since Reconstruction. 
Even immediately after Reconstruction and the advent of general fed-
eral question jurisdiction, "the modem idea of a truly federal implied 
constitutional action had yet to materialize."259 As Professor Michael 
Collins explains, when plaintiffs sought to vindicate a federal right in 
court, "[j]ust as before the Civil War, litigants pleaded causes of action 
- such as trespass, detinue, ejectment, or conversion - that were 
familiar to the common law and for which federal law was not the 
source"; then "in response to the officer's anticipated defense to the 
state law cause of action that his actions were authorized by state stat-
ute, plaintiffs would urge the unconstitutionality of that statute."260 
With the case of Ex Parte Young, 261 however, the Court endorsed 
a truly federal cause of action - based directly on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.262 Young "suggests that the Court was starting to con-
ceive of the right to relief in ... officer actions as flowing less from the 
proof of a familiar common law injury than from the Constitution it-
self. "263 Realistically, if a federal statute only nullifies a possible de-
fense to a common law cause of action, then to some extent the 
common law, not the statute, creates the right at issue.264 Before 
Young, then, federal statutes largely did not create rights, in the sense 
of claims for relief upon which a lawsuit could be based in the first 
instance. Statutory "rights" depended for their enforcement on the 
vagaries of common law litigation. 
Early on, the Court demonstrated that it would read rights in sec-
tion 1983 to mean only those federal interests that were directly en-
forceable in federal actions. In Carter v. Greenhow, 265 the plaintiff 
invoked section 1983 to recover property that a Virginia tax collector 
had removed from the plaintiff's residence after the plaintiff sought to 
pay his taxes with bond coupons.266 The Court found that no cause of 
action existed under section 1983. It held that the Contracts Clause, 
259. Collins, supra note 219, at 1544 n.264. 
260. Id. at 1511-12 (citing Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 489, 523-25 (1954)). 
261. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
262. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 43, at 1181. 
263. Collins, supra note 219, at 1513. 
264. Only after Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), did American jurisprudence 
begin to trace rigorously the source of rights to the federal or state sovereign. Before Erie, the 
federal statute was used as a statutory standard of care to determine the outcome of a common 
law cause of action. See Collins, supra note 219, at 1525, 1532-33. 
265. 114 U.S. 317 (1885). 
266. Carter was one of the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885), in which taxpayers 
attempted to pay their taxes to the state of Virginia with the interest coupons from state-issued 
bonds. The plaintiffs argued that the Virginia statute that repudiated a prior statute that author-
ized the state to accept the coupons as payment violated the Contracts Clause. 
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so far as it can be said to confer upon, or secure to, any person, any 
individual rights, does so only indirectly and incidentally. It forbids the 
passage by the State of laws such as are described. If any such are never-
theless passed by the legislature of the State, they are unconstitutional, 
null and void. In any judicial proceeding necessary to vindicate his 
rights under a contract, affected by such legislation, the individual has a 
right to have a judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the at-
tempt to impair its obligation. This is the only right secured to him by 
that clause of the Constitution. But of this right the plaintiff does not 
show that he has been deprived. The right to pay his taxes in coupons, 
and the immunity from further proceedings, in case of a rejected tender, 
are not rights directly secured to him by the Constitution, and only so 
indirectly as they happen in this case to be rights of contract which he 
holds under the laws of Virginia. 267 
Carter established that section 1983 did not eliminate the jurispru-
dential scheme by which federal rights were protected in state-law 
causes of action, and it acknowledged in essentially modern terms that 
the limitations on a plaintiff's ability to enforce the Contracts Clause 
must be seen as limits on the actual rights created by that clause. Re-
alism, as well as post-Erie jurisprudence, demands that a right be 
traced to the sovereign that provides the remedy. Because state-law 
causes of action partly defined the conditions under which litigants 
could obtain relief, Carter recognized that the plaintiff had not as-
serted a purely federal right. Carter involved only a right that existed 
prior to Reconstruction, however, and it left open the question of how 
to treat the civil rights created during and after Reconstruction. They, 
as well, could have been incorporated into common law actions, to 
nullify affirmative defenses based on state authority. Under the logic 
of Carter, then, the Reconstruction statutes would not have created 
rights enforceable under section 1983, because they would have de-
pended for their protection on an underlying common law claim.26s 
The language of the Reconstruction statutes and constitutional 
amendments, however, suggested that the federal government had 
"committed itself to protecting citizens against state and private indi-
viduals," and "created a national citizenship independent of that con-
267. 114 U.S. at 322. 
268. Professor Collins has persuasively argued that the early court interpretations of§ 1983 
limited its reach by construing those rights that were protected in the traditional, common law, 
manner as not "secured by the Constitution and laws" within the meaning of§ 1983. See Col-
lins, supra note 219, at 1502-06. This Note offers similar arguments, but contends as a matter of 
jurisprudence that a "right" not made "secure" through a remedy does not exist. In light of Erie 
and the achievements of the Realists, if a statute does not create a claim for relief in the first 
instance, it should be interpreted as not creating any federal right. Under this Note's interpreta-
tion, Collins errs (as did Justice Kennedy in his dissent in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), see supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text) in arguing that 
some constitutional provisions may serve as the basis for a claim "directly under the general 
federal question statute" and yet not create rights within the meaning of§ 1983. See Collins, 
supra note 219, at 1548-51. 
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ferred by the states."269 The rights for which section 1983 was the 
intended litigation vehicle represented obligations of the federal gov-
ernment alone. In the wake of Reconstruction, the Court proved no-
toriously conservative in interpreting the substantive provisions that 
could underlie section 1983 claims.270 Yet the basic message of section 
1983 was left intact: The federal commitments to individual rights 
with which section 1983 was associated would not be enforced through 
state courts in a common law form of action. They would be enforced 
directly.271 One might say that section 1983 did not so much create a 
right of action as rebut the traditional inference that federal statutes 
did not create a right of action against state officials, but were instead 
incorporated into a common law action. 
As an assessment of bare legislative intent, the argument that sec-
tion 1983 only preserved civil liability that would otherwise exist is 
obviously wrong. The drafters of section 1983 certainly thought they 
were creating civil liability. Yet the attempt to construe section 1983 
to effectuate the intent of its drafters has almost certainly failed. 
When the Court extended section 1983 to apply beyond civil rights 
laws to any federal law it used the plain language argument to justify 
an interpretation that clearly went beyond what the framers of section 
1983 envisioned.272 As a matter of sound jurisprudence, an attempt to 
give effect to the term rights in the statute, coupled with the Realist 
thesis, inevitably forces the conclusion that the remedies implicit in 
statutes circumscribe the limits of the rights they create. 
One persuasive piece of evidence for the thesis that section 1983 
rights tend to arise only from statutes that create implied rights of 
action anyway lies in the development of the Court's jurisprudence 
under the other Reconstruction statutes that section 1983 was in-
tended to enforce. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 273 the Court con-
strued 42 U.S.C. § 1982, descended from section 1 of the 1866 Civil 
269. Developments, supra note 247, at 1142, 1145. 
270. See id. at 1156-61. 
271. Collins, supra note 219, at 1504-06; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 250-51 
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978).' 
272. See Collins, supra note 219, at 1553. Even Professor Sunstein, who argues in favor of 
the Thiboutot decision, admits that, "[t]o be sure, the 1874 Congress did not foresee the enor-
mous explosion in federal legislation that has occurred in the twentieth century." Sunstein, supra 
note 149, at 409. His argument in favor of Thiboutot relies on section 1983's more general 
purposes: 
It is no doubt true that Congress was primarily concerned with providing a remedy for 
constitutional violations and unlawful invasions of rights protected by civil rights laws. But 
it is consistent with the historical evidence to understand the underlying purposes as more 
general than that, reaching all violations of federal law. 
Id. There is always a strong argument for giving a statute its literal meaning. Yet if literal 
interpretation may be used to expand section 1983, surely it can be used as well to contract it, by 
limiting § 1983's provisions to those laws that truly create rights. 
273. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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Rights Act,274 to authorize a private cause of action against private 
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property. The Court 
stated that "[t]he fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is couched in declaratory 
terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement does not, of 
course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an effective equitable 
remedy."275 Similarly, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 216 the 
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, also descended from the 1866 Act, 
·"affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employ-
ment on the basis of race."277 It concluded that "[a]n individual who 
establishes a cause of action under§ 1981 is entitled to both equitable 
and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circum-
stances, punitive damages."278 The treatment of sections 1981 and 
1982 as creating civil remedies of their own force - when section 
1983 obviously was once thought necessary to achieve this result -
vividly demonstrates the extent to which a jurisprudence of implied 
rights of action has displaced section 1983's role in providing reme-
dies. In a world where direct private enforcement of federal law is 
routinely available, section 1983's "rights" language should be inter-
preted to cover only those statutory commitments that are sufficiently 
firm to authorize private enforcement of their own accord. 
CONCLUSION 
A. An Analogy 
As a closing defense of this Note's interpretation of section 1983's 
"rights" language, it is worth recalling that a similar argument has 
occasionally been made with respect to the AP A's judicial review pro-
vision. From the time of the AP A's enactment up to the present, some 
commentators have maintained that the AP A only organizes those 
remedies that would already exist by virtue of the statute in ques-
tion.279 Under this view, the AP A creates no remedies, because viola-
274. See supra note 248. 
275. 392 U.S. at 414 n.13. 
276. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
277. 421 U.S. at 460. 
278. 421 U.S. at 460. 
279. See David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 41, 43-44; 
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 887 (1983); S. Walter Shine, Administrative Procedure Act: Judicial 
Review ''Hotchpot"?, 36 GEO. L.J. 16 (1947); see also Fletcher, supra note 109, at 255-64. 
Fletcher argued that in an inquiry regarding standing under the APA, "[t]he touchstone is that 
anyone whom a 'relevant statute' considers to be adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
has standing to seek review of the action under that statute." Id. at 255. If this is so, the APA 
adds nothing to the standing inquiry which is not already implicit in the statute itself. 
Just after the APA was enacted in 1947 one author stated flatly that "[t]he whole problem of 
the scope of judicial review of administrative action has been extensively analyzed and a reading 
of the legislative history seems to demonstrate that the Act fails to make any substantive 
change." Shine, supra, at 29 (citation omitted). 
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tions of statutes that, pre-AP A, would not have created remedies for 
the plaintiff, will also not amount to a legal wrong suffered by the 
plaintiff. 
This line of argument was rejected by the Court in Association of 
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp. 280 Moreover, in a re-
cent opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court acknowledged that it was too 
late in the day to consider a return to a "legal wrong" standard for 
judicial review.281 Yet as this Note demonstrated in Part III, the 
Court has essentially maintained the legal wrong standard through a 
"zone of interests" test that is closely related to the Cort v. Ash test for 
the existence of a legal right. 
Thus, despite its departure from the "legal wrong" standard, the 
Court has incorporated some Realist insights into its interpretation of 
the AP A. As Professor William Fletcher has written: 
[W]hether the term "standing" is employed, as in Clarke,· "implied cause 
of action," as in Cannon; "right of action," as in Louisiana; or "legal 
right," as in the common law examples, the important point to notice is 
that the question of whether plaintiff "stands" in a position to enforce 
the defendant's duty is part of the merits of plaintiff's claim. It is the 
sort of claim that can be tested in federal district courts under a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, or the sort of issue that is determined in the federal 
courts of appeals in deciding whether section lO(a) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act gives plaintiff the right to seek judicial review of adminis-
trative action. And it is the sort of claim whose contours are determined 
by looking to the substantive law upon which the plaintiff relies.282 
Professor Fletcher could just as easily have added "right secured 
by the Constitution and laws" to his list of inquiries that must be de-
termined according to the "substantive law" involved. He omits men-
tion, however, of the difference discussed above: in the AP A and 
section 1983 contexts, statutory language authorizes a cause of action 
where a plaintiff has suffered legal wrong or a violation of rights. If 
the statutory authorization of lawsuits in the context of the AP A and 
of section 1983 has any effect, the inquiries regarding private enforce-
ment under the remedial statute and directly under the statute itself 
should not be so similar. This Note has attempted to demonstrate, 
however, that the explicit authorization of a cause of action in section 
1983 - and by similar logic under the AP A - should not expand the 
scope of judicial authority beyond that which is already inherent in the 
traditional judicial role of enforcing the law. Because the language of 
section 1983 refers the judge back to a right that a policymaking body 
280. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Scalia, supra note 279, at 888-89; supra notes 110-11 and 
accompanying text. 
281. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990). 
282. Fletcher, supra note 109, at 239 (citation omitted). 
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other than the court has enacted, the judge's authority to fashion rem-
edies remains the same. 
A realistic view of rights requires the courts to distinguish between 
the enforcement of legal rights and the making of policy, and section 
1983 instructs courts only to enforce rights. Section 1983 should con-
tinue to apply where the plaintiff has a right - which means that it 
applies where the plaintiff has a legal basis for relief that is external to 
section 1983 itself. It may be that the Court will generate a term like 
zone of interests, and incorporate Realist insights into the reading of 
section 1983 without explicitly endorsing a Realist jurisprudence that 
lays bare the separation of powers questions behind the doctrine. Yet 
it would greatly clarify the jurisprudence of rights under section 1983 
simply to acknowledge that rights and remedies are one and the same. 
B. Summary 
The implied right of action cases reflected a controversy over the 
very authority of the judiciary to enforce the rule of law. One side 
held that the legislature creates rights, but that Marbury v. Madison 
provides courts an independent power to enforce rights. The other 
side contended that the judicial consequences of a statutory right were 
wholly within the power of the legislature and that, Marbury notwith-
standing, a right did not create a remedy unless Congress so intended. 
Cort v. Ash attempted to join these fundamentally irreconcilable views, 
with predictably incoherent results. 
At the same time, however, the implied right of action cases were 
really concerned with a less radical theory that continued the Court's 
rejection of a common law role for the federal courts. Most of the 
implied right of action cases concerned damage remedies, in which the 
case for Marbury enforcement of rights was far weak.er than in re-
quests for prospective relief. Although implied rights of action might 
have been justified as an exercise of common law policymaking, the 
Court was understandably reluctant to take this course. 
Even though Cort's doctrine of implied rights of action died, its 
inconsistencies survive in the body of section 1983 jurisprudence. 
When the new approach to section 1983 created in Maine v. Thiboutot 
forced the Court actually to construe the statutory term right, the con-
fusion created by Cort was replicated. The Court has recently ac-
knowledged in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., Golden State Transit 
v. City of Los Angeles, and Dennis v. Higgins that the primary issue in a 
section 1983 claim is whether the relevant statute creates a right. This 
new focus moves the Court closer to dispelling the misconceptions cre-
ated by Cort. 
The long-established role of the judiciary as the guarantor of the 
rule of law in our constitutional structure must include the authority 
to enforce legal rights. By the same token, however, a statute such as 
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section 1983, which conditions the authority to bring a lawsuit on the 
existence of a right, cannot expand the authority of the judiciary be-
yond what already exists. In Wilder, Golden State Transit, and Den-
nis, the Court has begun to act on this logic in the context of claims for 
injunctive relief by requiring a plaintiff claiming a section 1983 right to 
establish a statutory claim upon which the plaintiff would be able to 
sue independent of section 1983. 
A realistic view of the identity between rights and remedies indi-
cates that this same approach may also be extended to the use of sec-
tion 1983 to expand damage remedies. If the augmentation of 
statutory schemes through implied rights of action is rejected as unac-
ceptable common law policymaking outside the context of section 
1983, it should be no less so where section 1983 applies. Thus, the 
implied right of action and section 1983 tests should be the same. 
Both should recognize that the question is simply whether the statute 
at issue creates a right, understanding that the rights found will as a 
matter of definition be accompanied with a remedy. The Court can 
then begin to articulate a consistent theory of how Congress creates 
rights. 
